It's funny how, in the end, Craig agrees with Aquinas and the scholastics that God has no properties. Of course he's wrong, things have metaphysical parts, and many kinds of them: "There are more things in heaven and earth, dr. Craig, than are dreamt of in Ockham's philosophy".
What is Thomistic Simplicity vs Scotus vs generic strong Simplicity vs weak simplicity?Take a few days, months or years to answer then tell me where I can find out.I want to learn more.
@BenYachov:To understand the scotistic view of divine simplicity, Lee Faber's three-part series (starting here: http://lyfaber.blogspot.it/2010/11/divine-simplicity-i.html) is pretty good.Regarding "weak" simplicity, maybe it's just the position that God has no material parts. Or that his perfections are necessarily co-instantiated (but not identical to each other). Or something like that.
@Ben: That's a good question. 21st Century Scholastic points out a good reference regarding Scotus.As far as weak simplicity goes, I don't think it's mere incorporeality. I would hope that even theistic personalists like Plantinga and Craig think God isn't simple only in the same sense that an angel is. But as 21st Century Scholastic notes, it could be the idea that all his perfections are necessarily co-instantiated. I have actually read Thomas Morris--a contemporary theistic personalist philosopher at Notre Dame--say that he believes this to be the core idea of divine simplicity. You can find him saying this in his interesting book 'The Logic of God Incarnate'.I would say that generic 'strong simplicity' is the idea that God lacks composition, i.e. any proper parts. I call this 'minimal divine simplicity' since I take this to be the minimum required for orthodox Catholic belief. I've explained my view here: http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2012/08/minimal-divine-simplicity-and-trinity.html
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