tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-53753305493667255952023-11-26T21:30:22.093-08:00The Analytic Scholasticawatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comBlogger83125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-61008802322046957782020-09-30T08:54:00.008-07:002020-10-02T11:36:59.854-07:00St. John of Damascus and "Filioque"<p>St. John Damascene is frequently brought up in the filioque debate. Edward Siecienski recounts in his excellent <a href="https://amz.run/3cXa" target="_blank">book</a> that Damascene's statement that only the Father is Cause of the Holy Spirit was the primary stumbling block for the Greek delegation at the Council of Florence.</p><p>Damascene's views on the procession of the Holy Spirit are subtle, but it is clear from a number of places in <i>On the Orthodox Faith</i> that he understands the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Father through the Son. Indeed, he says this explicitly. Of course, some people might interpret this procession through the Son as a merely "temporal" procession.</p><p>However, what is less often noted is Damascene's teaching in his somewhat less accessible work, <i>On Heresies</i>. If I recall correctly, it received no mention in Siecienski's book, but it is important for making clear that Damascene's procession through the Son is not merely in the temporal sphere. At the end of the work, he gives a creedal statement explicating the main dogmas of the orthodox faith. Here is the relevant passage:</p><blockquote><p>Think of the Father as a spring of life begetting the Son like a river and the Holy Ghost like a sea, for the spring and the river and the sea are all one nature. Think of the Father as a root, and of the Son as a branch, and of the Spirit as a fruit, for the substance in these three is one. The Father is a sun with the Son as rays and the Holy Ghost as heat. (St. John of Damascus, On Heresies, 103)</p></blockquote><p>While this makes it clear how the procession is certainly <i>through</i> the Son, clearly, the river plays a role in the production of the sea, the branch plays a role in the production of the fruit, and the rays play a role in the production of the heat. In other words, the Son plays an intrinsic causal role in the production of the Spirit. On the other hand, from this analogy one can easily discern a sense in which only the Father is the cause of the Spirit.</p><p>This is the same as what Latin theology says, and in fact these analogies are almost identical to those given by the Latin writer Tertullian, who says explicitly that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son and is clearly referring to the eternal relations in the Trinity. (See <a href="https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0317.htm" target="_blank"><i>Against Praxeas</i></a> Chs. 4 and especially 8 for the analogies.) Indeed, I wouldn't be surprised at all if Damascene's original source for these images ultimately traces back to Tertullian.</p><p>The issue is that the Greek Fathers mean by "proceed" and "cause" to also include the fact that the Father is the Source of the entire Trinity, including of the procession which happens through the Son. Whereas the Latins have a more minimal conception when using the word "proceeds," and are merely signifying that both Father and Son play <i>some</i> sort of causal role in the production, even though the Son's role is secondary. The Latins, after all, affirm that the Spirit proceeds "principally from the Father," as St. Augustine says. For more on this, see <a href="https://catholicbridge.com/downloads/response-on-the-filioque.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. That is how St. Maximus was able to <a href="https://bekkos.wordpress.com/2008/01/21/st-maximus-on-the-filioque/" target="_blank">defend</a> the Latin filioque as orthodox.</p><p>The problem is that Easterners who agree with the commonly held monopatrist <a href="http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/english/photios_mystagogy.html" target="_blank">view</a> of Photius cannot accommodate Augustine or the other Western Fathers and saints, since this theory holds that the only procession through the Son is in the temporal sphere, while in the Trinity itself the Son and Spirit are like two completely separate branches from the Father, without any ontological relation to each other. There's no way to accommodate that within the Western Fathers, who already teach the filioque early on. But clearly the catholic Church cannot anathematize half of the Church Fathers. Western theology, on the other the hand, can easily accommodate the teaching of the Eastern Fathers that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, and that the Father is the source of the entire Trinity. As a number of Orthodox scholars have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Unity-All-Contributions-Theological-Dialogue/dp/1498200427/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=" target="_blank">recognized</a>, properly interpreted, there is not a contradiction between the Western and Eastern Fathers' views on the Holy Spirit's procession.</p>awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-20848645778444365722020-08-25T02:03:00.002-07:002020-08-25T08:04:08.499-07:00Did the Council of Vienne Rule Out Substance Dualism?I recently received a message from a reader, asking whether the Council of Vienne rules out the view in philosophy of mind known as "substance dualism." According to substance dualism, the soul is an incorporeal substance which can exist separately from the body. Famously, a version of substance dualism was held to by Descartes.<br />
<br />
I thought the response I wrote might be of interest and help to some readers. I would argue that, whatever other issues one might have with substance dualism, this position is not ruled out <i>dogmatically</i>. (This is not to say that I endorse the position or that I even consider it reasonable, of course.)<br />
<br />
The ratified decree of the Council of Vienne, promulgated by the Apostolic See, says this:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Moreover, with the approval of the said council, we reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the catholic faith every doctrine or proposition rashly asserting that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body, or casting doubt on this matter. In order that all may know the truth of the faith in its purity and all error may be excluded, we define that anyone who presumes henceforth to assert defend or hold stubbornly that the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the human body of itself and essentially, is to be considered a heretic.</blockquote>
Here is the answer I gave to the questioner, which I've adapted from our exchange:<br />
<br />
"It has been a while since I investigated this, but yes, I was pretty convinced at the time that the condemnation does not rule out substance dualism. Here are a few reasons:<br />
<br />
1) The text itself just says that the intellectual soul is per se and essentially the [substantial] form of the human body. That's what it says. That statement is not equivalent to the statement that a substantial form cannot be a substance. Someone might personally think that follows, because of a certain metaphysics of substantial forms. But the Council itself does not assert that.<br />
<br />
(Incidentally, as far as the metaphysics goes, Aristotle himself says that the form is a substance, in <i>Metaphysics</i>. The interpretation of these texts is quite convoluted of course, but it's clearly there. I'm not saying Aristotle was a substance dualist, of course.)<br />
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2) The Council primarily was aiming to condemn Peter John Olivi, who denied that it was the <i>intellectual soul</i> that was the form of the body. (See <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/olivi/#SouBod">here</a>.) Thus, if you hold to a theory of conciliar decrees that would primarily take a Council's <i>intentions</i> rather than a Council's <i>texts</i> as authoritative (a position I very much disagree with), that would place the emphasis of the Council's condemnation on the "intellectual soul" part, and the target of the condemnation would be Olivi, not substance dualism. In short, it is anachronistic to read a condemnation of substance dualism into the Council's decrees.<br />
<br />
3) The view that the soul is a substance continued on among Catholic scholastic thinkers whose orthodoxy was impeccable. In particular, Suarez thought that both the soul and the body were substances (albeit "incomplete" ones, as he says). Nobody ever thought this was particularly controversial, because again, one can believe this while still believing the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body.<br />
<br />
4) Even as thoroughgoing a substance dualist as Descartes was completely explicit that he held the soul to be the substantial form of the body. (He says this in several letters.) There are some good books on this, like Justin Skirry's <i>Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature</i>. As a side note, I generally agree with those quasi-revisionist interpreters of Descartes like Marjorie Grene and especially Roger Ariew who think Descartes should be understood within the context of late-medieval metaphysics.<br />
<br />
Apart from Descartes, J.P. Moreland has published <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Body-Soul-Nature-Crisis-Ethics/dp/0830815775" target="_blank">a book</a> that strongly advocates for both views: that the soul is the substantial form of the body, and that it is a substance. (How authentic to Thomas it is, I'm not sure.)"<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The reader also kindly pointed me to Pohle and Preuss's commentary on the dogmatic decree, <a href="https://archive.org/details/godadogmatictrea00pohluoft/page/n153/mode/2up" target="_blank">here</a>. Here was my response:<br />
<br />
"On pp. 148 ff. the authors are quite cautious in noting that this text should not be interpreted as saying much about hylomorphic metaphysics, and if I understood right they even suggest that it is compatible with Atomism, which goes well beyond anything Descartes ever said! Given their interpretation in 148 ff., I cannot see how Descartes's position could even remotely be thought of as being within the purview of the Council's condemnation.<br />
<br />
They are also correct to point out that the condemnation was drawn up by Scotists, who give the soul and body a rather stronger form of existence than Thomists in their account of the body-soul composite. It would seem especially absurd, in that case, to think they were somehow endorsing a specifically Thomistic hylomorphic metaphysics."<br />
<br />
Again, my point here is purely one of what is Church doctrine. There are many issues with substance dualism as a philosophical position, and probably the Church's formulation rules out <i>some </i>versions of it, e.g., if you really did take seriously the idea that the soul is just a "ghost in the machine." But no real historical advocate of substance dualism would have said that, to my knowledge (certainly not Descartes). Arguably, Plato was a substance dualist, and clearly held that the soul is the form of the body that makes it to be living. Probably some Platonic Christian philosophers prior to the revival of Aristotelianism held similar views. A priori, then, it seems highly unlikely the Council was trying to rule these out. If they are to be ruled out, I think it would have to be for metaphysical reasons.</div>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-74477939879821732142020-07-24T04:27:00.000-07:002020-07-24T05:42:07.169-07:00Richmond Lattimore's Conversion<div style="text-align: justify;">
A short <a href="https://www.crisismagazine.com/2008/richmond-lattimore" target="_blank">eulogy</a> written for Richmond Lattimore, perhaps the most famous modern English translator of Homer, by Father George Rutler, the priest who baptized him in the Catholic faith. Excerpt:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div style="text-align: justify;">
After the monumental translation of The Odyssey and even more transporting Iliad, he Englished the four Gospels, the Book of Acts and Epistles, and the Revelation whose author he did not think was the Apostle John. There was one evangelist he preferred for his elegant Greek, and when recovering in hospital from surgery he said that his doubts about the Faith had disappeared "somewhere in Saint Luke." He announced that he would be baptized at Easter. At the public baptism, with closed eyes and head uplifted, Dick solemnly recited the Creed whose Greek was his vernacular. He instructed that at his funeral this story be told to all his academic colleagues.</div>
</blockquote>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-38097562231510645292020-07-16T14:23:00.000-07:002020-07-16T17:01:19.586-07:00Vatican II on the Historicity of the Gospels <blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Sancta Mater Ecclesia firmiter et constantissime tenuit ac tenet quattuor recensita Evangelia, quorum historicitatem incunctanter affirmat, fideliter tradere quae Iesus Dei Filius, vitam inter homines degens, ad aeternam eorum salutem reapse fecit et docuit, usque in diem qua assumptus est. (<i><a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_lt.html" target="_blank">Dei Verbum</a></i> 19) </div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Holy Mother Church has firmly <i>and with utmost constancy</i> maintained, <i>and continues to maintain</i>, that the four Gospels, <i>whose historicity she unhesitatingly affirms</i>, <i>faithfully hand on </i>what Jesus, the Son of God, while he lived among men, <i>really did and taught </i>for their eternal salvation, until the day when he was taken up. [Emphasis added]</div>
</blockquote>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-23932913531617695742020-07-16T03:34:00.002-07:002020-08-21T08:04:19.711-07:00Contradiction Between Luke and Matthew on Judas' Field? Part II<div style="text-align: justify;">
In the <a href="https://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2020/07/contradiction-between-luke-and-matthew_15.html" target="_blank">previous post</a>, I began discussing the apparent contradiction between Luke and Matthew on who purchased Judas' Field of Blood. I made some important preliminary points about parentheses and quotation practices in Luke, and I said I will try to show how the two passages are consistent by modifying the placement of parentheses. I will then argue for a slightly different translation of verse 18.<br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
So, where should we place the parentheses? I'll just give you my answer. But it is a worthwhile exercise for the reader to consider what happens if we consider different placements of parentheses. (Or even whether we should have any!) There are actually many options here, several of them are interesting, and different placements might help explain the consistency of Luke's passage with Matthew's in different ways. But here is how I would do it, and I will explain why:</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
15 In those days Peter stood up among the believers (together the crowd numbered about one hundred twenty persons) and said, 16 “Friends, the scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit through David foretold concerning Judas, who became a guide for those who arrested Jesus— 17 for he was numbered among us and was allotted his share in this ministry. 18 Now this man acquired a field with the reward of his wickedness; and falling headlong, he burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out." 19 (This became known to all the residents of Jerusalem, so that the field was called in their language Hakeldama, that is, Field of Blood.) 20 “For it is written in the book of Psalms, ‘Let his homestead become desolate, and let there be no one to live in it’; and ‘Let another take his position of overseer.’</blockquote>
Not a huge change in placement, but a rather significant change in meaning. It changes the relevant passage about the Field of Blood (verse 18) from being merely Luke's narration to part of Peter's discourse.<br />
<br />
Why is that important? In particular, how does this mere matter of placement make verse 18 any <i>less </i>in tension with Matthew 27:7? After all, just because <i>Peter</i> said it, that doesn't make the statement say anything different, right?<br />
<br />
Well, no, actually, because as any linguist worth his salt will tell you, the meaning of an utterance is <i>extremely sensitive</i> to the context of utterance in which it occurs, i.e. to the <i>discourse</i> in which it is uttered. For example, the utterance "John is not a bad worker" can convey something completely different depending on whether it is uttered (a) by John's friend, in response to someone unfairly maligning John as a bad worker, or (b) by John's unimpressed supervisor, in response to the question "Isn't John such an amazing worker??"<br />
<br />
So what does it do to the meaning of verse 18 when it is moved into Peter's speech? Well, it turns the statement from a mere <i>reporting of a fact </i>by the narrator, Luke, into a partly <i>rhetorical and oratorical device</i>, in an impassioned and prophetic speech given from the mouth of St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, as he leads them with the first guidance they have received in an address since the Ascension.<br />
<br />
<a name='more'></a><br />
So what is Peter saying here? First, let me provide the passage (verse 18) as it is found in Greek, so that we can identify several important words (for an English interlinear translation, see <a href="https://biblehub.com/interlinear/acts/1-18.htm" target="_blank">here</a>):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐκτήσατο χωρίον ἐκ μισθοῦ τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ πρηνὴς γενόμενος ἐλάκησεν μέσος καὶ ἐξεχύθη πάντα τὰ σπλάγχνα αὐτοῦ</blockquote>
A couple interesting points. First off, Luke uses the word ἐκτήσατο (ektesato), which is a less common and somewhat ambiguous term. It is translated as "purchased," but it usually has a more general meaning of "acquire," "possess," "get," or even "control." For example, in 1 Thessalonians 4:4, St. Paul uses it as follows:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<b>1 Thessalonians 4:4 (NRSV)</b> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
3 For this is the will of God, your sanctification: that you abstain from fornication; 4 that each one of you know how to <i>control</i> [or "possess"; κτᾶσθαι, ktasthai] your own body in holiness and honor. (Interlinear <a href="https://biblehub.com/interlinear/1_thessalonians/4-4.htm" target="_blank">here</a>.)</blockquote>
Luke himself uses it earlier in a more generic sense in Luke 21:19 (NRSV): "By your endurance you will gain [κτήσασθε; ktesasthe] your souls." And Matthew himself seems to use it to mean "take": "Take no gold, or silver, or copper in your belts." (10:9, NRSV). In fact, in most other verses where it appears, the word does not seem to literally mean "buying" or "purchasing."<br />
<br />
Importantly, this is different from the word Matthew uses at 27:7 for "purchase," ἠγόρασαν (egorasan), which is far more common in the NT, and unambiguous.<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<b>Luke</b>: ἐκτήσατο (ektesato) - <a href="https://biblehub.com/greek/2932.htm" target="_blank">occurs</a> only 7 times in the NT, including Acts 1:18. If I am right about Acts 1:18, then arguably in all cases except one or two it does not mean "purchasing."</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<b>Matthew</b>: ἠγόρασαν (egorasan; think "agora") - <a href="https://biblehub.com/greek/strongs_59.htm" target="_blank">occurs</a> 30 times in the NT, including in Luke, unambiguously referring to purchasing.</blockquote>
What is important is that the word in Luke is much more ambiguous than the one in Matthew, and can more easily sustain several meanings, affecting its usefulness with respect to the rhetorical effect in Peter's speech.<br />
<br />
A second important point is that, in addition to the word in Acts being translated as "purchase," Luke uses the word μὲν (men), which can mean "indeed." Many translations, not entirely unreasonably, leave this phrase out. Perhaps this is because they assume it doesn't affect the meaning of the verse, given that the verse is parenthetical and that Luke the narrator is merely reporting facts. However, it also makes sense that Luke includes this phrase if it is part of Peter's oratory. After all, someone giving a speech will commonly use the phrase "Indeed!" for its rhetorical force.<br />
<br />
Thus, in the end, I would suggest we instead translate the first part of verse 18 as follows:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"This man indeed acquired a field from the reward of his wickedness!"</blockquote>
Putting all this together, my final reading of the passage, modifying the NRSV, would be this:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
In those days Peter stood up among the believers (together the crowd numbered about one hundred twenty persons) and said, "Friends, the scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit through David foretold concerning Judas, who became a guide for those who arrested Jesus— for he was numbered among us and was allotted his share in this ministry. Now this man indeed acquired a field from the reward of his wickedness! And falling headlong, he burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out." (This became known to all the residents of Jerusalem, so that the field was called in their language Hakeldama, that is, Field of Blood.) "For it is written in the book of Psalms, ‘Let his homestead become desolate, and let there be no one to live in it’; and ‘Let another take his position of overseer.’"</blockquote>
The rhetorical force of Peter's statement in this context, and perhaps playing on the double-meanings of the words involved, would be something like this: That Judas <u>got</u> his reward alright - an ignominously-named field! - remembered as the place that was purchased "from the reward of his wickedness," and now infamously associated with Judas forever.* [Also, see end-note.]<br />
<br />
That, at least, is one reading that strikes me as plausible given the placement of the verse into Peter's speech and the new translation. Though I should note there are other ways of reading it, all of which would be consistent with the priests' having been the ones who actually <i>bought</i> the field with Judas' money.<br />
<br />
What are the positive reasons for our placing the parentheses this way, and for this translation?<br />
<ol>
<li>As regards the parentheses, as I've already mentioned, Luke's including the word "indeed" makes sense if it is a rhetorical device in Peter's speech. That would place verse 18 within Peter's speech.</li>
<li>Furthermore, the prophetic fulfillment of the Psalms in Peter's speech, which the NRSV translators ascribe to Peter, <i>makes much more sense</i> if Peter <i>himself</i> had just previously mentioned Judas' death. This is because Peter quotes two different Psalms. He first quotes a version of Psalms 69: "Let his homestead become desolate, and let there be no one to live in it." The Psalm is well-known as one of the major imprecatory Psalms, and it asks God to punish those who persecuted his Holy One. It is also well-known as a prophecy referring to Christ's passion. Here is part of the Psalm, as translated from the Septuagint:<br /><br /><b>Psalms 69:22-3 (translation from Septuagint)</b><br />22 They gave [me] also gall for my food, and made me drink vinegar for my thirst. 23 Let their table before them be for a snare, and for a recompense, and for a stumbling-block. 24 Let their eyes be darkened that they should not see; and bow down their back continually. 25 Pour out thy wrath upon them, and let the fury of thine anger take hold on them. 26 Let their habitation be made desolate; and let there be no inhabitant in their tents: 27 Because they persecuted him whom thou hast smitten; and they have added to the grief of my wounds. 28 Add iniquity to their iniquity; and let them not come into thy righteousness. 29 Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and let them not be written with the righteous.<br /><br />Clearly, the reason this Psalm is fulfilled in Judas is because Judas was punished for his persecution of the Christ. But if we insert the parentheses as the NRSV originally does, then Peter's speech reads as follows:<br /><br />"... for he was numbered among us and was allotted his share in this ministry. For it is written in the book of Psalms, ‘Let his homestead become desolate, and let there be no one to live in it’; and ‘Let another take his position of overseer.’"<br /><br />That is rather awkward. And more importantly, it is not even clear how the first Psalm (69) is fulfilled by what Peter has just said. On the other hand, with our revised translation and placement of parentheses, Peter's speech makes much more sense:<br /><br />"...for he was numbered among us and was allotted his share in this ministry. Now this man indeed acquired a field from the reward of his wickedness! And falling headlong, he burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out. For it is written in the book of Psalms, ‘Let his homestead become desolate, and let there be no one to live in it’; and ‘Let another take his position of overseer.’"<br /><br />This seems to me a strong independent reason for placing verse 18 within Peter's speech.</li>
<li>As regards the translation, one reason for it is that it would make Luke more easily cohere with Matthew! Note that you don't have to believe antecedently in inerrancy to think this is a good consequence of our interpretation.</li>
<li>More importantly, as I have argued above, given that 1 and 2 show verse 18 to be <i>part of Peter's speech</i>, the word "indeed" should be understood as having a more prominent role instead of simply being dropped in translation. And it also is reasonable to assume that Peter is taking advantage of the ambiguities present in the already less-common word "ἐκτήσατο." Hence we, too, should translate it with the same ambiguity, perhaps by "acquired" or "got."</li>
</ol>
Now perhaps the reader has some objections to my position. The first might go something like this:<br />
<br />
Objection: "Look Alfredo, this is just plain counter-intuitive! Most translations include the parentheses where they do, and that's because it makes intuitive sense."<br />
<br />
Reply: "Counter-intuitive you say? Only because your intuitions and those of English Bible readers have been trained by translators' parenthetical propaganda!" 😉<br />
<br />
Incidentally, just by looking at the Bibles I have on-hand or can easily access, I discovered that at least the following translations include the parentheses in the common (I say <i>wrong</i>!) way:<br />
<ul>
<li>RSV, NRSV, ESV, NASB, NIV</li>
</ul>
<div>
<i>All guilty!</i> As it happens, these are precisely the modern translations that are read by most Protestants! - lay or scholarly, conservative or liberal. They also are read by very many Catholics, particularly the RSV and (more among scholars) the NRSV. (Though it seems the NRSV will soon be read by more lay Catholics, as it is the chosen translation for the new <a href="https://www.wordonfire.org/bible/" target="_blank">Word on Fire Bible</a>.) Indeed, I myself prefer several of these translations most of the time. No wonder so many have been misled, and read the verse with a parenthetical bias!<br />
<br />
On the other hand, the following translations do not include any parentheses, one way or another:<br />
<ul>
<li>KJV and Douay-Rheims</li>
</ul>
<i>Not guilty! </i>More grist for the mill for KJV-onlyists and some Catholics I suppose! Unfortunately for the KJV, however, it seems to be one of the earliest perpetrators of the "purchase" mistranslation. On the other hand, after writing this post I learned that the Douay-Rheims gloriously translates Acts 1:18 as follows:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
And he indeed hath possessed a field of the reward of iniquity, and being hanged, burst asunder in the midst: and all his bowels gushed out.</blockquote>
Pretty close! Now imagine if for hundreds of years we had only read the verse this way. Would people be so immediately convinced there is a contradiction between Matthew and Luke?<br />
<br />
All of this once again confirming my respect for the Latin version tradition. Of course, most of the credit goes to the Vulgata Clementina I suppose (though the English translators certainly get some props for decisively opting for formal equivalence):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Et hic quidem possédit agrum de mercéde iniquitátis, et suspénsus crépuit médius : et diffúsa sunt ómnia víscera ejus.</blockquote>
Beautiful!<br />
<br />
Now, the only translation I checked that correctly <i>puts verse 18 in quotation marks </i>was (can you believe it?) the Catholic NABRE!</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>NABRE "<i>And you, O NABRE, are not the least among the English translations!"</i></li>
</ul>
To my great surprise, they not only avoided the misplacement of parentheses (as the KJV and D-R also do), but even correctly placed the verse in quotations. In fact, the NABRE considers <i>all </i>of the verses of Acts 1:16-22 to be part of Peter's speech. Not bad guys! I have to admit I've gained a little more respect for the NABRE New Testament. (Although, like most others, they still mistakenly translate the Greek word "ektesato" as "purchase." But you can't really blame them for that - they've not yet read my post!) I just hope they don't mess the parentheses up when they re-translate the New Testament in 2025!</div>
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In seriousness though, it is notable that at least one major, scholarly translation agrees with me on including verse 18 in Peter's speech. And so it is worth asking the question: What if instead of, say, the NRSV, the also-highly-respected NABRE had become the most prominent translation used among scholars and laymen? Would people really have such strong intuitions about the placement of parentheses?<br />
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It seems to me then that this isn't a serious complaint. There's another objection though.<br />
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Objection: "Come on Alfredo, look how long this took you! You had to go through all these hoops just to conclude that we should slightly re-translate one little verse and move a couple parentheses around. Clearly you are performing mental acrobatics."<br />
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Reply: "Nope, that is just called biblical interpretation. It involves looking closely at a text and reasoning thoroughly about its meaning in context. If you think what I just did is bad, look up another field called 'textual criticism'. I expect you will be positively scandalized when you see how scholars expend hundreds of pages arguing over single words or phrases. But I should tell you that most scholars consider this a legitimate form of inquiry."<br />
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And besides, when all is said and done, the central point I have made here can actually be put quite simply: Verse 18 should be included in Peter's speech. By not including it in Peter's speech, editors have often been misled into mistranslating the verse. Looking more closely at the verse in context, including its vocabulary, it should instead be translated as having Peter say: "This man indeed acquired a field from the reward of his wickedness!" And that, I would argue, is less evidently inconsistent with Matthew 27:7's claim that it was the priests who bought the field with Judas' silver.<br />
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Before concluding, I would like to note one potentially significant implication of this result. Aside from the fact that it shows Luke and Matthew to be consistent, it also knocks out an important argument against the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farrer_hypothesis" target="_blank">Farrer Hypothesis</a> about the synoptic problem. According to this hypothesis (defended by some scholars, like <a href="http://www.markgoodacre.org/Q/" target="_blank">Mark Goodacre</a>), Mark wrote first, then Matthew based on Mark, and then Luke based on both. This theory would allow us to dispense with Q, since obviously there is no longer a need to posit a special, historically-unattested document to explain the agreements between Matthew and Luke.<br />
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One objection is that if this were so, Luke would have reconciled his material with Matthew better, and one prominent example is the supposed contradiction between the two on Judas' death. Indeed, no less a scholar than Fr. Raymond Brown makes this argument, in his <i>Introduction to the New Testament</i>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Where Luke and Matt have almost contradictory accounts, why did Luke not make some effort to reconcile the difficulty? For example ... Luke's account of the death of Judas in Acts 1:18-19 is scarcely reconcilable with Matt 27:3-10."</blockquote>
But if Acts 1:18 is ascribed by Luke to Peter, and Peter is only reminding the crowd that Judas, as God's punishment, did indeed "get a field" as his reward - a field infamously associated with him, his blood money, and his ignominious death - then it is not the case that the verse in Acts is "scarcely reconcilable" with Matthew. And I would emphasize to the reader that, if what I have argued is correct, verse 18 would not even have <i>seemed</i> to Luke to be in conflict with Matthew's account, and it only seems so to us because of a small number of failures of translation and punctuation.<br />
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[*] An additional hypothesis, which I haven't provided evidence for so far, is that perhaps it was well-known that Judas wanted the money in the first place in order to buy himself a field or piece of land. In that case, it would be especially ironic that the chief priests purchased a field with the returned silver, and that this place now called the "Field of Blood" came infamously to be associated with Judas (either because of the association with his blood-money, or perhaps because he himself died on it). If that were the case, then my translation of Peter's words in 1:18 would make even <i>more </i>sense, and would have the force of "Judas indeed got his field with that money!"<br />
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As it happens, there is some plausibility to this hypothesis, since in Matthew 26:15 it was Judas who first asked the priests how much they would be willing to pay him. Evidently, the amount of silver Judas acquired was the right amount for getting a field. (Matt. 27:7) The fact that Judas spontaneously went to the priests <i>on his own </i>(all the synoptics repeat this), <i>himself</i> apparently suggesting the option of a monetary arrangement (Matt. suggests this; and besides, what else would he have been hoping to ask the priests for when he got there?), presumably proposing this idea with some sort of "price"-range in mind, and accepting their price - equivalent to the price of a field - suggests that Judas may have been interested in getting himself some property from all this. Admittedly, however, this is conjectural, and it is not essential to my argument.</div>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-5096376097603028422020-07-15T23:59:00.004-07:002020-07-16T12:51:25.099-07:00Contradiction Between Luke and Matthew on Judas' Field? Part I<div style="text-align: justify;">
One difficulty in the New Testament is the apparent contradiction between Ss. Matthew and Luke in the recounting of Judas' death and the purchasing of a field.</div>
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There are two main problems: (1) How did Judas die? (2) Who bought the Field of Blood?*</div>
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In Acts, Luke describes Judas' death while recounting a speech of St. Peter's. Luke seems to say that Judas died by falling and bursting open (presumably from a height?). He also seems to claim that Judas purchased the Field of Blood himself.</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>Acts 1:15-20 (NRSV)</b></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
15 In those days Peter stood up among the believers (together the crowd numbered about one hundred twenty persons) and said, 16 “Friends, the scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit through David foretold concerning Judas, who became a guide for those who arrested Jesus— 17 for he was numbered among us and was allotted his share in this ministry.” 18 (Now this man acquired a field with the reward of his wickedness; and falling headlong, he burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out. 19 This became known to all the residents of Jerusalem, so that the field was called in their language Hakeldama, that is, Field of Blood.) 20 “For it is written in the book of Psalms, ‘Let his homestead become desolate, and let there be no one to live in it’; and ‘Let another take his position of overseer.’</blockquote>
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Compare with Matthew, who says that Judas died by hanging himself. He also seems to say that it was the chief priests who purchased the field:</div>
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<b>Matthew 27:1-10 (NRSV)</b></blockquote>
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1 When morning came, all the chief priests and the elders of the people conferred together against Jesus in order to bring about his death. 2 They bound him, led him away, and handed him over to Pilate the governor. </blockquote>
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3 When Judas, his betrayer, saw that Jesus was condemned, he repented and brought back the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests and the elders. 4 He said, “I have sinned by betraying innocent blood.” But they said, “What is that to us? See to it yourself.” 5 Throwing down the pieces of silver in the temple, he departed; and he went and hanged himself. 6 But the chief priests, taking the pieces of silver, said, “It is not lawful to put them into the treasury, since they are blood money.” 7 After conferring together, they used them to buy the potter’s field as a place to bury foreigners. 8 For this reason that field has been called the Field of Blood to this day. 9 Then was fulfilled what had been spoken through the prophet Jeremiah, “And they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of the one on whom a price had been set, on whom some of the people of Israel had set a price, 10 and they gave them for the potter’s field, as the Lord commanded me.”</blockquote>
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In short, we have the following apparent contradictions regarding Judas' death:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>Luke</b>: Judas died by falling (from a height?) and bursting open. </blockquote>
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<b>Matthew</b>: Judas died by hanging himself.</blockquote>
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Also, regarding the field:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>Luke</b>: Judas bought the field. </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
<b>Matthew</b>: The chief priests bought the field.</blockquote>
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As with most alleged contradictions in the NT, one can easily come up with <i>some</i> way of reconciling these passages. After all, they do not form a logically inconsistent set.</div>
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For example, you might claim that Judas hanged himself over a cliff, the rope broke, and he fell down and burst open. You might also hypothesize that Judas later arranged the purchase of the field at the behest of the priests. Thus, if one had particularly strong reasons for believing in biblical inerrancy beforehand, one might opt for a harmonization like this, even if it is not plausible in itself. (Incidentally, one good reason for believing in biblical inerrancy is that <a href="https://www.catholic.com/magazine/print-edition/is-scripture-inerrant" target="_blank">it is the constant teaching</a> of the Catholic Church, including of Vatican II, as I explain <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2020/07/literary-forms-and-catholic-teaching-on.html" target="_blank">here</a>.) It would be better, though, if we could find a plausible way of explaining these apparently divergent accounts.<br />
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Specifically, I will try to harmonize Luke's and Matthew's accounts about the purchasing of the Field of Blood. Personally, I do not find the issue about the manner of death very troublesome: The language in Acts describing Judas' death is vague in several respects, so for all I know what Luke is saying is consistent with Matthew (although I don't embrace any particular story about how the two should be made consistent; I don't think there's enough evidence to say for certain).</div>
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The approach I want to take here isn't entirely new: It will involve questioning the translators' placement of parentheses, and their attributing what is really said by St. Peter to Luke the narrator, as the NRSV does in verses 18-19:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
(Now this man acquired a field with the reward of his wickedness; and falling headlong, he burst open in the middle and all his bowels gushed out. 19 This became known to all the residents of Jerusalem, so that the field was called in their language Hakeldama, that is, Field of Blood.)</blockquote>
Others have questioned this editorial decision, and said that perhaps what is in parentheses is all just a quote from St. Peter. And since biblical <i>quotes</i> can be mistaken without the biblical text itself being mistaken, Luke and Matthew are consistent. There are several issues with this response:<br />
<ol>
<li>It is clear that this answer is often motivated by a desire merely to preserve inerrancy. Usually there is not much positive evidence given for the view. Furthermore, although this position might technically preserve inerrancy, it does so by allowing the Scriptures to <i>just barely </i>skirt by, which seems unfitting.</li>
<li>St. Peter seems to be moved by the Holy Spirit in making this speech, and so it seems unlikely he would have been mistaken on this. Not to mention the intrinsic implausibility of Peter's making a mistake about a matter so local to him.</li>
<li>What does this mean for other quotations in Scripture of holy people other than Christ? Can we simply dismiss the contents in the quotes because they are mere quotations?</li>
<li>There is a further problem, which is that it is not even clear given the literary conventions Luke was writing under that he, as the narrator, was not <i>also</i> <i>affirming </i>Peter's speech by his quoting it. In that case, the literal meaning of the text includes not just the reporting of Peter's words, but the affirmation of them. (What I say below in the second point I make is also somewhat relevant to this. See also my earlier post about <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2020/07/literary-forms-and-catholic-teaching-on.html" target="_blank">"literary forms"</a>.)</li>
</ol>
With that said, my attempt at harmonization <i>will </i>involve questioning the editors' decisions on the placement of parentheses. A few things to note at the outset: </div>
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<ul>
<li>First, it is worth remembering that the ancient manuscripts of Acts do not distinguish the inserted parenthetical part from the rest of St. Peter's speech. In other words, the ancient manuscripts of Acts <i>do not contain any parentheses</i>. (The same is true of all the NT books.)<br /><br />Incidentally, I thought it would be fun to see this for myself, so I decided to look at the passage in Codex Sinaiticus, which is one of the most important (perhaps <i>the </i>most important) manuscripts of the Scriptures. It originally contained the entire Greek Bible, and more than half of its Old Testament has still survived (including all of the deuterocanon!). Most importantly, it is one of the very few ancient copies of the <i>entire New Testament</i> that we have (c. 330-360) and its text of the New Testament is regarded by many scholars as among the most useful in accurately determining what the sacred authors originally wrote. The reader can check out images of the passage from Acts <a href="http://www.codexsinaiticus.org/en/manuscript.aspx?dir=prev&folioNo=7&lid=en&quireNo=86&side=v&zoomSlider=0" target="_blank">here</a>. (The relevant verses starts at the bottom of third column.) Pretty cool.</li>
<li>Second, and related to the first point (as well as to 3 above), it should be noted that ancient authors, and particularly the Gospel writers, need not have had - indeed almost certainly <i>would not</i> have had - the same literary conventions regarding quotations and parentheses, or even punctuation, that we do 2000 years later.<br /><br />(Just think about what has happened over the last 2000 years, just in the standardization of printing and copying, the formalization and teaching of rules for writing, the evolution of linguistic conventions, etc., not to mention the <i>enormous </i>changes in the fields of literature and education.) <br /><br />Incidentally, the reader may be interested to know that the Stuttgart edition of the Vulgate (the <i>Biblia Sacra Vulgata</i>) does not contain <i>any punctuation at all</i>. My understanding is that this accurately conveys the complete lack of punctuation in the original Vulgate manuscripts.</li>
<li>Third, given that there simply <i>are no</i> parentheses or quotation marks in the manuscript, and that conventions for quotation might have been different for Luke than they are for us, I actually do not think it is impossible that the entire passage is all part of Peter's speech (although this is not what I myself will argue below).<br /><br />In particular, I am not convinced that ancient conventions would not have allowed quotation and narration to "blend together" in a way, and so the fact that Luke writes that the field was called Hakeldama "in their language" or that he refers to "all the residents of Jerusalem" doesn't necessarily mean he is not ascribing the statement to Peter's speech. Nevertheless, I don't insist on this below.<br /><br />(By the way, this point should also be kept in mind when it comes to famous passages like John 3:16 ff., where there is some dispute about whether the verse should be ascribed to the narrator or to Jesus. The answer might be both! [Or, indeed, that it is somewhat semantically indeterminate!])<br /><br />Again, the point here is that the practice of quotation probably worked somewhat differently or more loosely than it does in our own practice. In fact, given that there simply <i>are </i>no quotations or parentheses at all, it is probably better to speak more loosely of "indirect discourse," as linguistic theorists often do nowadays - although even this may be too idealized as a representation of ancient practice. Indeed, our "rules" of quotation and our theories of indirect discourse are to a smaller extent idealized representations of even our <i>own</i> ordinary practices, as is evident from the fact that I myself have already used quotations "incorrectly" (or at least inexactly) several times so far in this blog post.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Fourth, and in conclusion: Given that there <i>were</i> no parentheses in the original, where we should place parentheses (if any) is an interpretive question. So there are <i>many</i> possibilities for where the parentheses might be placed, and we should consider them.</li>
</ul>
So, where should we place the parentheses? In the <a href="https://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2020/07/contradiction-between-luke-and-matthew.html" target="_blank">next post</a>, I will give you my answer!</div>
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* A smaller issue is in the reasons given for its being <i>called </i>the Field of Blood, though I don't find this especially bothersome. It could be that Matthew is using "for this reason" or "therefore" ("diò") to refer to the entire foregoing story, including Judas' death, in which case he is saying the same thing as Luke. It also could just be there are several reasons the place is called Field of Blood, or that different groups of people call it that for different reasons, or that over time the reasons for its being called changed. Or there could be something else going on here. Either way, it doesn't seem especially problematic to me.<br />
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Incidentally, if Matthew is referring to the entire foregoing story, Matthew might <i>also </i>be using diò as a literary device to express fulfillment (perhaps at the same time as the other meanings). "It is for this reason [to cast ignominy on the place of Judas' death] that [God in his providence has brought it about] that the field has been called the Field of Blood to this day."</div>
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awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-36132547544529127572020-07-15T00:06:00.001-07:002020-08-21T09:01:31.250-07:00Literary Forms and Catholic Teaching on Inerrancy<div style="text-align: justify;">
Magisterial documents clearly show that biblical inerrancy is <a href="https://www.catholic.com/magazine/print-edition/is-scripture-inerrant">the teaching</a> of the Catholic Church, including of Vatican II. Nevertheless, many have been confused by a common mistranslation of Vatican II's document <i>Dei Verbum</i>:</div>
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Since therefore all that the inspired authors or sacred writers affirm should be regarded as affirmed by the Holy Spirit, we must acknowledge that the books of Scripture firmly, faithfully, and without error teach <i>that truth which God, for the sake of our salvation, wished to see confided to the Sacred Scriptures</i>. (Emphasis added)</blockquote>
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In fact, <i>Dei Verbum</i> says this:</div>
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Cum ergo omne id, quod auctores inspirati seu hagiographi asserunt, retineri debeat assertum a Spiritu Sancto, inde Scripturae libri veritatem, quam Deus nostrae salutis causa Litteris sacris consignari voluit, firmiter, fideliter et sine errore docere profitendi sunt.</blockquote>
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In truth, the document just claims that "the books of Scripture teach truth." No demonstrative "that" can be found. There is no "eam" or "illam." Hence, no phrase "<i>that</i> truth" which might <i>limit </i>the truth of the Scriptures' statements to <i>only </i>the (presumably smaller) number of statements which are there "for the sake of our salvation." So there's no reason at all to think that Vatican II justifies abandoning previous unambiguous papal statements on inerrancy, statements which only have ever been affirmed and then reaffirmed.</div>
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Furthermore, it is clear that Vatican II's teaching on <i>inspiration</i> positively <i>entails </i>inerrancy given the first half of this passage, which identifies "all that the sacred authors assert" as <i>also</i> being "asserted by the Holy Spirit." Since the Holy Spirit by His very essence cannot be in error, it is analytically true (by definition) that His assertions are true. Hence, "<i>all </i>that the sacred authors assert" is <i>true</i>.<br />
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We can formalize this argument:<br />
<ol>
<li>The set of statements that are asserted by the sacred author in Scripture = the set of statements asserted by the Holy Spirit in Scripture. [Statement actually made by Dei Verbum. Also see end-note.*]</li>
<li>If A asserts p, and A is not in error, then p is true. [Analytic truth; by definition]</li>
<li>The Holy Spirit cannot be in error. [De fide; also known by reason]</li>
<li>So, all the statements that are asserted by the sacred author in Scripture are true. [By 1-3]</li>
</ol>
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1 - 3 logically entail 4, which is what inerrancy is. I see no way out of this.<br />
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Of course, all this still leaves open the question of what the sacred authors assert. Here, the Church has plainly <a href="http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_30091943_divino-afflante-spiritu.html">noted</a> the value of historical-critical studies of the Bible, and obviously does not insist on a literalistic interpretation of all of Scripture. Furthermore, the Church has clearly exhorted interpreters to be attentive to the authors' uses of "literary forms" or "genres" - phrases that rather inadequately express the full range of interpretive tools available to orthodox biblical exegetes.</div>
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In actuality, it might be better to speak of sacred authors' uses of "literary devices," and of "literary customs" that were taken for granted among the authors and their peers (although even here, this is still probably inadequate to cover all that is meant by "literary forms"). See, for example, Pius XII's <i><a href="http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_30091943_divino-afflante-spiritu.html">Divino Afflante Spiritu</a>, </i>secs. 33 ff. - a text that absolutely must be read by Catholic interpreters to understand the nuances of the Catholic position on inerrancy.</div>
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So, for instance, at least to the best of my understanding I cannot see a problem with views like <a href="https://amz.run/3Ofh">Michael Licona's</a>, which claim that Gospel authors rearranged materials in a partly non-chronological way in accordance with literary customs of their time, and were therefore neither trying to mislead the audience nor trying to convey an exact chronology of events. At least, that is, I cannot see a problem from the perspective of Catholic dogmatic teaching on inerrancy. (This isn't necessarily to say I agree with Licona's view, of course.)</div>
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The Church's acknowledgment of "literary genres" (or Pius XII's somewhat better phrase "forms of expression") is just the acknowledgment that literary conventions and devices can affect the assertoric content of a given Scriptural statement. In other words, the <i>meaning</i> and therefore <i>the "truth-conditions"</i> of a given passage of Scripture might not be what they seem to us on a first reading, since the authors of Scripture may have been working (perhaps even unconsciously) under somewhat different literary conventions than we are used to or familiar with. </div>
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Incidentally, this is just a simple application of the more general view, widely accepted in linguistic theory nowadays, that <i>what is said</i> in a given utterance is determined by many factors, including wider communicative conventions - a point which is all the more salient in the case of written literature, which also involves <i>literary</i> and <i>cultural </i>customs. (Again, these conventions can cause the meaning of an utterance to go beyond even what the author <i>himself</i> consciously intends or realizes.)</div>
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As a simple example, consider some of the rather large numbers given in the Old Testament, such as the sentence in Exodus 12: "And the people of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth, about six hundred thousand men on foot, besides women and children." Reading this as if it were a statistic from the US Census Bureau, we would conclude that the Scriptures claim that a count of the people leaving Egypt would have shown there to have been approximately 600,000 men leaving Egypt (and therefore an estimated 2.4 million people total).</div>
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However, Pius XII (<i>Divino Afflante Spiritu</i> sec. 37) clearly indicates that an orthodox Catholic may interpret some passages with numbers like these as hyperbolic.</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
Nevertheless no one, who has a correct idea of biblical inspiration, will be surprised to find, even in the Sacred Writers, as in other ancient authors, certain fixed ways of expounding and narrating, certain definite idioms, especially of a kind peculiar to the Semitic tongues, so-called approximations, and certain hyperbolical modes of expression, nay, at times, even paradoxical, which even help to impress the ideas more deeply on the mind.</blockquote>
In other words, the sacred author might just be saying <i>a lot of people left Egypt</i>.<br />
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While we have applied this idea to a smaller unit of Scripture - one verse - it can of course be applied to larger units or components of Scripture as well.<br />
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Note that this is quite different from claiming that a given biblical statement is merely intended to be "allegorical," "symbolic" or "figurative." That can often be the case too, but that is not the point here. For instance, it need not be that the number "600,000" was chosen because of some deep <i>symbolic </i>significance to Jews. It also needn't be that the claim that 600,000 Israelite men left Egypt was an "allegory" for something else (the reference to which only the cleverest readers might figure out).</div>
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Instead, the point is that <i>even the literal meaning </i>of a given sentence or passage of Scripture might be different from what that passage would mean if it were transposed into a different genre, or a different cultural, literary, or social context - for example, ours.</div>
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Importantly, this is <i>entirely different</i> from claiming the Scriptures contain errors or contradictions. The sacred author is not in <i>error</i> in putting forward the sentence "The people of Israel journeyed ... about 600,000 men on foot," because despite how it might appear to some modern readers devoid of any context, he wasn't <i>saying </i>the same thing as the US Census Bureau does when it claims "there are 600,000 men."</div>
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As a side-note, I have sometimes wondered what people who doubt inerrancy because of passages like these think the sacred author was doing in writing them. Suppose that this particular number is the result of some later, individual author's redaction. Do they think the author just lied, and was trying to deceive his audience? Or that the author insanely thought he could accurately <i>guess</i> the number hundreds of years later?</div>
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Of course, sometimes the author might be reporting an oral tradition, which was itself perceived by the author clearly to be a tradition trying to convey precisely accurate history. But two questions arise here: (1) Do we really think ancient authors were not intelligent or critically-minded enough to realize what parts of oral tradition were probably a historically accurate core, and which were likely hyperbolic manners of phrasing? I would argue that in fact the opposite is probably true. (2) When the author really is repeating what he takes to be a tradition that <i>is </i>attempting to convey information with historical accuracy, then maybe we should take that information seriously as actual history! </div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
But again, because of (1), I suspect we often will need to distinguish that part of the tradition the author understands to be historically accurate from that part which the author himself would realize to be an "artistic embellishment." So suppose the author heard verbally, perhaps via orally-given stories or narrations, "And the number of Israelite men leaving Egypt numbered 600,000 -- not to mention all the women and children!" If the sacred author, hearing this, could make these distinctions about what is "asserted" by the oral tradition, then it is reasonable to assume that in repeating the tradition in writing the sacred author <i>too </i>was asserting the "historically accurate core" through the entirely acceptable form of a classic, ancient Semitic "hyperbole," of the sort identified by Pius XII. In our case (translating into common, contemporary idiom) the author may well be making the historical claim that a large number of Israelites did, in fact (as a historical matter!) leave Egypt - and there were <i>a lot of them</i>! But when it comes to that, the sacred author's claim <i>may well be reliable</i>, and we cannot simply assume the tradition is unhistorical.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
As I have already noted, while I have chosen a simple example, and have only tried to interpret a single verse, biblical exegetes can apply these interpretive methods at higher levels to larger units or components of the text. Of course, this doesn't mean "anything goes," and biblical interpreters should not engage in eisegesis, or try to hide from difficulties merely by invoking "literary forms." I certainly do not think all Scriptural difficulties can be resolved by the discernment of literary devices, and from what I can tell even an acknowledgment of literary forms will require Catholics to often take a "conservative" view in interpreting Scripture (although this is a phrase I do not particularly like here). </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Nevertheless, noting the importance and relevance of these interpretive methods might make Scriptural inerrancy less difficult for some people to accept in certain cases.<br />
<br />
Of course, I should note that due to confusion about biblical inerrancy over the last 60 years, this is a topic that the Vatican has been asked to issue clarification on, and if I have made a mistake in all this I happily submit to the guidance of the "Church of the living God, pillar and bulwark of the truth."<br />
<br />
[*] Maybe someone will try to deny 1 by noting the slight semantic ambiguity in the Latin word "assero," which can also have slightly less precise meanings like "declare." However, it is utterly clear in context that it should be translated "asserted" or "affirmed" (as the original translation above does). But apart from the fact that this is patently reaching and is not a plausible interpretation, it doesn't matter anyway, because the phrase "quod auctores inspirati seu hagiographi asserunt, retineri debeat assertum a Spiritu Sancto" uses "assero" in both clauses, and the phrase certainly <i>includes</i> assertion. Thus, 1 follows anyway: Whatever is asserted by the sacred author falls under the extension of "assero", and is therefore also asserted ("assertum") by the Holy Spirit - even if we grant the implausible reading that some things might somehow only be "declared" but not "asserted" by the Sacred Author.<br />
<br />
Incidentally, it should be noted that the inspiration and veracity of the Scriptures is not, for Catholics, a conclusion reached merely by historical study of the books of Scripture. It is not just the rational conclusion of an inductive process of looking at all the biblical writings and determining that they seem pretty good accuracy-wise. On the contrary, it is a revealed truth, handed to the Church through the Apostles orally and in their writings, declared and protected by the Magisterium, and accepted by faith (albeit in harmony with reason). The doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures is like the doctrine of the Trinity: And just as the latter was authoritatively taught by Nicaea and Constantinople to be a truth of revelation, so the former is taught to be a truth of revelation by councils like Vatican II.</div>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-5194651957981115892020-06-04T20:19:00.002-07:002020-06-04T23:01:07.857-07:00Was Berkeley Right about Mathematics?<div style="text-align: justify;">
It is pretty common in discussions of the history of mathematics for authors to mention Berkeley's attack on the calculus, usually with some derision, though in the more sophisticated authors it is a balance of derision and respect (or, at least, empathy).</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
For example, here is a nice summary of the episode by Penelope Maddy:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="text-align: justify;">
In the late 1600s, in response to a number of questions from physical science, Sir Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz simultaneously and independently invented the calculus. Though the scientist's problems were solved, the new mathematical methods were scandalously error-ridden and confused. Among the most vociferous and perceptive critics was the idealist Berkeley, an Anglican bishop who hoped to silence the atheists by showing their treasured scientific thinking to be even less clear than theology. The central point of contention was the notion of infinitesimals, ridiculed as 'the ghosts of departed quantities'. Two centuries later, Bolzano, Cauchy, and Weierstrass had replaced these ghosts with the modern theory of limits. (<i>Realism in Mathematics</i>, p. 22)</blockquote>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
What seems funny about Berkeley's critique is the apparent confidence with which he proffered it, in contrast to the rigorous development the calculus would undergo in the following centuries. What extracts a measure of respect is the fact that, at the time he wrote, Berkeley was not wrong.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
But if, on a charitable reading of Berkeley, his point wasn't forever to cast doubt on the calculus, but rather to point out that the metaphysical and logical foundations of mathematics are not more justified than the suppositions of faith, it is interesting (and somewhat amusing) to ask whether Berkeley has actually been disproved in this.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Obviously, mathematics as a science is certain. Berkeley never denied it. But that's different from saying the <i>metaphysical and logical foundations</i> of mathematics are certain. These latter are characterized by disputes without termination. They involve paradoxes and uncertainty. And they require the acceptance of assertions whose justification and warrant are, by the admission of philosophers and mathematicians, puzzling.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
For example, the most common picture throughout the 20th century was that set theory serves as a foundation for mathematics. However, touring the landscape of views on this matter will make you dizzy.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Here are a few questions that are recognized as utterly central yet by all appearances unresolved: Is there only one correct set theory, objectively true to the exclusion of all others? What are sets? Are they physical or non-physical? If they are non-physical, how can we even possibly know about them? If they are physical, which physical things are they, and are we sure there are enough of them to serve as a foundation for mathematics? (And if there are, how could we know <i>that</i>?)</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Of course, answers to these questions have been proposed <span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">–</span> some would claim successfully. Maybe so. But many theologians say the same about their solutions to puzzles about the mysteries of the faith, and a comparison of their theories with those of philosophers of mathematics might well show that the former aren't any worse off than the latter.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Again, Berkeley's point is just that the theological mysteries are not more doubtful than the foundations of our beloved mathematics. He gets teased for not realizing that his objections to the calculus would be answered a hundred years later, but there are questions similar to his that are still unanswered by logicians and philosopher of mathematics. So, joke's on them!</div>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-60749081417406953152017-04-28T11:25:00.001-07:002017-04-28T11:27:42.633-07:00Sober on Essentialist Explanations in Science"My suggestion is that the gas's kinetic energy explains <b>what it is</b> for the gas to have the temperature it does. It does not explain <i>why</i> the gas has the temperature at the time in question. The relationship here is much like the one between a dispositional property and its physical basis. If zebras differ in fitness because of their leg structure, then there is a sense in which leg architecture explains fitness relationships. The relationship is not causal; it does not explain why those fitness values came into existence. Science not only explains why certain states of affairs and events come into existence; it also seeks to explain <b>the nature</b> of those events."<br />
<br />
--Elliott Sober, <i>The Nature of Selection</i>, p. 75.<br />
<br />
Note that explanation is hyperintensional, and that not just <i>any </i>necessarily coextensive term would work equally well in place of 'the gas's kinetic energy' here.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-89441606468257123952017-04-26T19:45:00.002-07:002017-04-26T19:45:19.406-07:00Laplace and Mereology"We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; <b>for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain</b> and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes." -- <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon">Laplace</a><br />
<br />
My understanding is that Laplace's demon was primarily intended as a heuristic for understanding microphysical determinism. But there is a serious question (noted by or implicit in the work of a number of philosophers of science, e.g., Sober, Loewer, Albert) as to whether, in fact, "nothing" about the physical universe would escape the demon's knowledge. There is some ambiguity in what is meant by "submit these data to analysis," but intuitively it seems that the demon's abilities would only allow him to know all of the facts describable in microphysical terms. There is a real question then about whether this would amount to knowledge of <i>all of the facts</i>, including about mereologically composite objects, let alone about minds.<br />
<br />
Would we need to add to the demon's capacities, then, some sort of additional "translation manual" to tell him which macro-states are being realized by the micro-physical states? And would this amount to a problem for a reductionist picture of the world? Maybe, maybe not.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-48735921014041562312016-10-03T07:37:00.000-07:002016-10-03T07:41:37.421-07:00Thomistic Moderate Realism Reduces to Armstrongianism or PlatonismI've always had difficulty understanding Aquinas's "moderate realist" view on universals, at least as that view is expounded by his interpreters. It seems that they want to have their cake and eat it too: Thomists both believes that universals are "objective" and "extramental" in some sense. But they also are not extreme realists, i.e., (modern) Platonists. They also seem to say things that make it sound as if universals are merely conceptions; if taken at face value, that reduces to conceptualism or nominalism of some sort.<br />
<br />
Here's one way of bringing out the problem.<br />
<br />
Assuming there are universals, then:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>1. Either (a) universals exist extramentally or (b) they do not exist extramentally.</li>
<li>2. If (b), then nominalism or conceptualism, QED.</li>
<li>3. If (a), then either (i) they only exist in the objects that have them, or (ii) they sometimes exist outside of the objects that have them.</li>
<li>4. If (i), then that is Armstrong's view.</li>
<li>5. If (ii) then that is Platonism.</li>
<li>6. So if (a) is true, then either Armstrong's view or Platonism is true, and so moderate realism either reduces to Armstrong's view or Platonism.</li>
</ul>
6 already seems to disambiguate the Thomistic view in a way that makes it unacceptable, and does not let it have all of the desirable qualities it is supposed to have.<br />
<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>7. If Armstrong's view holds, then universals depend on the objects that have them, and therefore cease to exist if the objects do.</li>
<li>8. But if the universals cease to exist, then statements about non-existent things, like "dinosaurs are big creatures", do not require universals to be true, and so universals are superfluous.</li>
<li>9. So if Armstrong's view holds, then universals are superfluous.</li>
</ul>
<br />
<br />
That only leaves Platonism, and there are huge problems with Platonism.<br />
<br />
To be fair, I am leaving much unsaid here, and I am not making any distinctions within "Platonism." But ultimately I think this is basically correct; the way Platonism is construed in modern times basically just is the view that there are non-mental, objective, necessarily existent, universals.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-83061542571666456542016-08-18T10:45:00.002-07:002016-08-18T10:48:46.992-07:00Naturalness vs. "Arbitrariness" and "Simplicity" in MereologyThere are three answers one can give to the question: "When does composition occur?"<br />
<br />
(1) Always.<br />
(2) Sometimes.<br />
(3) Never.<br />
<br />
The first view is something like David Lewis's view: Any plurality of objects composes a third. Hence, for example, there is an object consisting of Barack Obama, my left leg, an orange, and half of the beach in Santa Monica. (We could call it the BLOB.) This is the view encompassed in classical mereology.<br />
<br />
The third view is something like Peter Van Inwagen's view in 'Material Beings'. This view holds that (with maybe a few very specific exceptions), there are not, literally, any composite objects. There are just "simples" -- atoms in the void, physically proximate to each other and arranged in various ways.<br />
<br />
The second view encompasses all other possibilities. One of these possibilities is "common sense" ontology, or something like it. One such view might hold that things like physical organisms, tables and chairs, rocks, planets, stars, maybe even galaxies, etc. are composite objects. But not just any plurality of things constitutes an object on this view; for instance, there is definitely no object such as the BLOB.<br />
<br />
One argument (I think due to Van Inwagen) says that (2) can be ruled out rather easily because it is arbitrary and/or overly complicated. Hence, we must choose between (1) and (3).<br />
<br />
However, it seems to me that people who hold to (2) might argue that their ontology only encompasses what is natural; just as there is a distinction between natural properties (like 'having mass') and gerrymandered properties (like 'being Barack Obama-or-my leg-or-an orange-or-half of Santa Monica Beach'), there may well be a distinction between natural composites and gerrymandered composites. And just as one might choose to privilege the natural properties by saying they are the only ones that exist (as D.M. Armstrong does), so one might choose to privilege the natural composites by saying they are the only ones that exist.<br />
<br />
Obviously more needs to be said than this and this view would need to be fleshed out. But I'm more interested in the methodological question, and all I need granted is that it is a distinction one could coherently use so as to avoid (1) or (3).<br />
<br />
Now, people like Van Inwagen might (probably, <i>would</i>) respond to this view by claiming that it is arbitrary, that it multiplies distinctions, that the notion of "naturalness" is mysterious and vague, and so on.<br />
<br />
But I think it is worth noting here an "arbitrariness" in this objection: Claiming that some entity is more natural than another (or, by extension, that one's theory is more natural) is no more mysterious than claims that that (2) is arbitrary and complex, and that (1) and (3) are non-arbitrary and more simple. Defining the sense in which (1) and (3) are "non-arbitrary" and "simpler" is no easier than defining the sense in which (2) is "more natural."<br />
<br />
Frankly, simplicity and arbitrariness, as used in this way, seem to me to be just as bad off as the other notions that anti-hyper-intensionalists use as criteria of theory choice; they are themselves hyperintensional notions in fact. That's not to say that they are bad off -- I <i>do</i> think there is an intuitive sense in which theories can be "simpler" and "less arbitrary" than other theories. But it is arbitrary to use "arbitrariness" and "simplicity" as criteria for selecting between metaphysical theories, and then pretend you don't know what it means when one says that his theory is more "natural" than others or, relatedly, posits entities that are "more natural."awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-82110366986284262082016-07-19T13:18:00.002-07:002016-07-19T13:19:37.797-07:00Pragmatics at HomeHere's an interesting case of implicatures I noticed the other day when discussing what movie to watch with my wife. (>> means "pragmatically implies" and *>> means "does not pragmatically imply")<br />
<br />
Case One:<br />
W: Do you want X?<br />
H: Only if you want it.<br />
>> I don't want it.<br />
*>> I do want it.<br />
<br />
Case Two:<br />
W: Do you want X?<br />
H: Not if you don't.<br />
>> I do want it.<br />
*>> I don't want it.<br />
<br />
What is strange about this case is that, presumably, the husband H's responses in both cases are logically equivalent to each either; assuming I'm parsing them right, they both say "I want X only if you want X" or, equivalently, "I do not want X if you do not want X." (***See bottom of page for an explanation, if this isn't clear.)<br />
<br />
But the response in Case One (at least sometimes) implies something different than the response in Case Two. (I say 'at least sometimes', because, as with many implicatures, it may depend somewhat on the sonic properties of one's utterance too -- i.e., the way one pronounces the words.) But this seems to imply that the implicature is "detachable" in Grice's sense (see the bottom of p.57 and ff., <a href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ls/studypacks/Grice-Logic.pdf">here</a>).<br />
<br />
However, according to classical Gricean pragmatics, <i>conversational</i> implicatures are non-detachable; hence, if these were conversational implicatures, they would both imply the same things (which they don't). So it seems that they must be <i>conventional</i> implicatures. (See <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/#CCSI">here</a> on that distinction.) That's sort of weird though, because conventional implicatures are usually associated with syncategorematic expressions that do not contribute any additional truth-conditional meaning to the sentence (for instance, "however," "but," "even though," "nevertheless," etc.).<br />
<br />
Also, these implicatures seem to be more like conversational implicatures than conventional ones, since they do seem to sort of follow from something like Grice's Maxim of Manner (or, better, <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/#NeoGriPra">Levinson's M-Principle</a>); i.e., saying something in an equivalent but roundabout way implies a non-standard meaning. For depending on whether one uses the double negation form or not you get a different implicature. However, it doesn't *quite* fit this rule I think, because it doesn't seem like either of the response from Case One or Case Two is more "roundabout" than the other; in other words, the responses in both cases seem to be symmetric as far as the "oddness" of their phrasing goes.<br />
<br />
Anyway, kind of an interesting case. FYI, in the actual situation, I *did* want it, but I didn't want it if she didn't. : - )<br />
<br />
***<br />
To see the equivalence, note that all of the following are equivalent:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>I want it only if you want it.</li>
<li>I only want it if you want it.</li>
</ul>
<br />
(These are clearly equivalent. For consider the following:<br />
x goes to the store only if x is hungry.<br />
x only goes to the store if x is hungry.)<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>If you do not want it, I do not want it.</li>
<li>I do not want it if you don't want it.</li>
</ul>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-1485513598362509442016-06-29T05:39:00.001-07:002016-06-29T06:02:26.419-07:00Modernizing (and Medievalizing) AnalyticityA project I've been hoping to do eventually is to re-work the <i>concept-containment</i> notion of analyticity. Something has always seemed to me intuitive about it, at least in the "Bachelors are unmarried" sorts of cases. (From the 19th century onward, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Semantic-Tradition-Kant-Carnap-Station/dp/0521447070/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1467115638&sr=8-1&keywords=semantic+tradition+coffa">for various reasons</a>, the analytic truths seem to have become equated with the logical truths; this seems wrong to me.)<br />
<br />
I'd also like to see whether the notion of analyticity comes up at all in <i>medieval </i>philosophy, and whether any of the tools of medieval philosophy could be of use for this project (or, what would be just as interesting, whether they would find the concept-containment notion of analyticity hopelessly confused).<br />
<br />
There are several problems for the concept-containment approach, but a big one is this:<br />
<br />
<b>1. Forms of Analytic Judgments</b>: Kant (sometimes) defined analyticity in terms of conceptual containment, roughly as: A judgment of the form 'A are B' is analytic iff the concept <b>B</b> is contained in the concept <b>A</b>.<br />
<br />
The worry is that there are many judgments that do not seem to have this form, but where they seem to also be true in virtue of 'meaning' or 'concepts' (or something close). Some examples, taken from <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/#Fre">SEP</a>:<br />
<blockquote style="background-color: white; border-left-style: none; color: #1a1a1a; font-family: serif; font-size: 16.5px; line-height: 21px; margin: 1em; padding: 0px;">
<blockquote style="border-left-style: none; margin: 1em; padding: 0px;">
(11) If Bob is married to Sue, then Sue is married to Bob.<br />
(12) Anyone who's an ancestor of an ancestor of Bob is an ancestor of Bob.<br />
(13) If x is bigger than y, and y is bigger than z, then x is bigger than z.<br />
(14) If something is red, then it's colored.</blockquote>
</blockquote>
Other examples, from Jerrold Katz:<br />
<blockquote style="background-color: white; border-left-style: none; color: #1a1a1a; font-family: serif; font-size: 16.5px; line-height: 21px; margin: 1em; padding: 0px;">
<blockquote style="border-left-style: none; margin: 1em; padding: 0px;">
(15) Mary walks with those with whom she herself walks.<br />
(16) Mary walks with those with whom she herself strolls.<br />
(17) Poor people have less money than rich people.<br />
(18) Rich people have more money than poor people.</blockquote>
</blockquote>
It's not totally clear how all of these examples can be analytic (assuming they all are) if we take analytic truth to mean that the predicate-concept is contained in the subject-concept.<br />
<br />
I don't have a worked-out answer to this yet, but I suspect that some of the work in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_linguistics">cognitive linguistics</a> might be helpful. In fact, Katz' <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Semantic-Theory-Studies-language-Jerrold/dp/0060435674">own work</a> might be helpful here, though from what I understand Katz is a Platonist (rather than a "conceptualist") about meaning, and so it would have to be properly adapted.<br />
<br />
In addition to these strategies, where medieval philosophy might be useful here is in seeing how we might, in fact, be able to reformulate all "basic" sentences and then parse them out so that they <i>technically </i>obey the constraint of "subject-copula-predicate" form.<br />
<br />
As Terence Parsons <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Articulating-Medieval-Logic-Terence-Parsons/dp/0199688842/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1467117179&sr=1-1&keywords=parsons+articulating+medieval+logic">points out</a>, medieval scholastic Latin is unique in that it is a <i>natural language</i> and yet there is no distinction between a sentence's ordinary surface grammar and its <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-form/">logical form</a>.<br />
<br />
Now, if one had a close enough association between words and mental concepts, one might then be able to get a nice conceptualist-type semantics going. And it seems certain medieval thinkers <i>did </i>have precisely this sort of close association between mental concepts and meaning, viz., in the theory of "subordination" (I'm thinking of Buridan and Ockham right now).<br />
<br />
This suggests that we could translate basic ordinary-language sentences into medieval subject-copula-predicate sentences, and the concept-containment idea could become more useful again.<br />
<br />
I'm not sure it will be as simple as that or that this will solve everything, but I suspect it will make things easier.<br />
<br />
There are some other issues for a conceptual containment theory of analyticity too:<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>2. Conceptual Containment</b>: There are really at least two problems here: (a) a <b>theory of concepts</b>, and (b) a <b>notion of containment</b>. Can we give a plausible and clear theory of both? (And, what would be even better: Can we give a theory of both that is mathematizable and subject to rigor and computation once we are given a case?) And how neutral can we be here with respect to different theories of concepts and containment?<br />
<br />
How can medieval philosophy help here? Medieval philosophy certainly contains much discussion of concepts, and that should certainly be useful.<br />
<br />
As for the notion of containment, I can't help but think of Scotus' theory of "repugnance" and "non-repugnance" by which he assesses the modal status of basic propositions -- the kinds of propositions concept-containment seems to be after (see page 162, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=r6aZlbqnw_YC&pg=PA164&lpg=PA164&dq=repugnance+scotus&source=bl&ots=CEe53EMhDK&sig=ZzGEzykgBqNJXXLC39bkJBToDBM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjci7CDnc3NAhUIej4KHUvmC_8Q6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q&f=false">here</a>). What's interesting is that Scotus seems to define repugnance as a relation holding between <i>terms</i>. That seems to make it a <i>semantic </i>relation rather than a <i>conceptual </i>relation for Scotus; moreover, the relation's holding is said to be grounded in "notae," which are in some sense objective features of the external world.<br />
<br />
So this isn't exactly concept-containment analyticity; but still, in terms of its formal/logical properties, non-repugnance/repugnance behaves similarly to concept-containment/exclusion. (This seems to be an instance of a more "externalist," metaphysical picture of containment and exclusion relations; I get the sense that this sort of externalism is the norm in medieval philosophy, especially pre-Nominalism, though even after that as well.) Moreover, like repugnance-relations, concept-containment relations are supposed to ground the modal status of propositions, and moreover, they both seem to deal with the same sorts of propositions. So I can't help but think Scotus will be helpful here, even if he probably wouldn't have a view of analyticity like Kant's.<br />
<br />
<b>3. Rigor</b>: How would a rigorous conceptual semantics go? Can we make it as formal, precise and mathematical as the non-conceptualist semantics have been? Some <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Geometry-Meaning-Semantics-Conceptual-Spaces-ebook/dp/B00HZDIY6C/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1467117596&sr=8-2&keywords=peter+gardenfor">work</a> has already been done on this sort of thing, but there's more to be said. Again, I wonder if the medieval logic might help us here, since Parsons and others have shown it to be entirely rigorous and fit for mathematical treatment. Medieval logic at its height was generally far more sophisticated than anything after it -- certainly more sophisticated than anything Kant did on logic -- and so I can only imagine it will make this project easier.<br />
<br />
<b>4. Externalism</b>: Although the conceptual-containment approach seem plausible in certain cases, so does <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_externalism">semantic externalism</a>. Gillian Russell, a professor here at UNC, has done some <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Truth-Virtue-Meaning-Synthetic-Distinction/dp/0199694737/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1467117711&sr=8-1&keywords=gillian+russell">brilliant work</a> on updating analyticity to take these post-Kripkean insights into account. However, she tends toward the more externalist side of things, and I'd like to see whether we can salvage more of the connections between meaning, analyticity and concepts than she does, while still giving a reasonable account of the externalist insights (something I worry cognitive semantics a la Peter Gardenfors hasn't quite done -- see 4.1 <a href="http://www.ling.gu.se/~biljana/st1-97/tenetsem.html">here</a>, for instance).<br />
<br />
One thing I worry about in trying to find analyticity in medieval philosophy is that medieval philosophy seems to tend much more toward externalism about semantic content (though this is only a hunch I get -- I can't point to anything specific). But maybe I'm wrong and there is room for analyticity in medieval philosophy; and even if not, the project may still be worthwhile, since maybe we will find new reasons to either abandon or revise our conception of analyticity in interesting ways we've never thought of.<br />
<br />
So I plan to do some research on medieval logic and semantics in the next few weeks, and maybe this will help my concept-containment project. Moreover, I think it is an interesting historical project in its own right to see whether something like analyticity can be found (or reformulated) in terms of medieval semantic categories.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-84495492357034961792016-03-20T23:21:00.002-07:002016-03-20T23:25:16.657-07:00Perceptual Representation: Pictures and Sounds, Seeing and HearingPerceptions are <i>representations</i>. What representations <i>are</i> can be cashed out in several ways.<br />
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First, they are <i>about</i> something.<br />
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Second, they represent the world <i>as being</i> a certain way.<br />
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Moreover, they have <i>satisfication notions </i>associated with them (and corresponding satisfication <i>conditions</i>, i.e., conditions that must obtain for them to be satisfied). The satisfaction notion of desires is 'being fulfilled' or not; with belief it is 'being true' or not; with volitions it is 'being done' or not; with commands it is 'being obeyed' or not; and with perceptions it is 'being accurate' or not.<br />
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Representations include words, sentences, beliefs, pictures, questions, paintings, videos, signs, diagrams, maps, hand gestures, commands, recordings, desires, and, in the case at hand, perceptions.<br />
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If a given representation has a satisfaction notion associated with it, it will also follow that it has satisfaction conditions. Giving the satisfaction conditions for a type of representation is (at least part of) giving a <i>semantics</i> for that type of representation.<br />
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Much work has been done on giving semantics for various sorts of <i>linguistic</i> representations. Whole classes of sentences have been given rigorous semantics. For instance, famously, modal language has been given a whole semantic theory, rigorously formulated in terms of mathematical models involving possible worlds.<br />
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Arguably, something similar can be done for <i>pictures</i>.<br />
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If a rigorous semantics can be given for pictures, this may hold some promise for giving a rigorous semantics for <i>visual perceptions</i>. Naively, we think of vision as giving us an "image". Think for instance of Ernst Mach's drawing of his own visual field:<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhV3AnjNtKDHqSEew_YjSCzx3uKq3l2VhibkjF7ENmqio7AFS5xl97jr8lx_9d0apb02YazIUKhBKF5i9DpdiYLRn-eK3jQOIaIon3UwgZW0nVlX9E4BvWqOPCX8JBAkiSqjyfUjYcXdm0/s1600/Monocular-view.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="281" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhV3AnjNtKDHqSEew_YjSCzx3uKq3l2VhibkjF7ENmqio7AFS5xl97jr8lx_9d0apb02YazIUKhBKF5i9DpdiYLRn-eK3jQOIaIon3UwgZW0nVlX9E4BvWqOPCX8JBAkiSqjyfUjYcXdm0/s320/Monocular-view.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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Mach's picture of the visual field</div>
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With appropriate modifications for the perspective and particularities of our visual field, the <i>naive </i>application of pictorial semantics to visual-perceptual semantics would be to straightforwardly give the <i>same </i>semantics for our <i>visual perceptions</i> as we would for a <i>drawing </i>of our visual field.<br />
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This is obviously simplifying hugely and leaves a host of questions unanswered. But it allows us to get a preliminary grip on things.<br />
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What I'm interested in lately is whether, suitably modified, the semantics of auditory perception will be similar to the semantics of visual perception.<br />
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You can think of visual perception as giving you a picture, where the picture includes such properties as {OBJECT, SHAPE, MOTION, COLOR, DISTANCE, SPACE, TEXTURE, CAUSE, AGENCY}. All of these properties are represented in visual perception (and, with most of them, in pictures too, at least generally).<br />
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(Note: One of the simplifications we have to make in assuming the semantics of visual perception is just like the semantics of pictures is that, as with the semantics of pictures, visual perceptions do not have a <i>temporal-duration</i> aspect: A good assumption for pictures maybe, which can be thought of as "instantaneous" in some way; on the other hand, a bad assumption for visual perception, which as perceptual psychology demonstrates represents motion, and an even worse assumption for auditory perception.)<br />
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So we can think of vision as giving a picture. Can we think of <i>hearing </i>as giving us a picture too? If we can, then if the move from pictorial semantics to visual-perceptual semantics is relatively straightforward, then so will the move be from pictorial semantics to auditory-perceptual semantics (and maybe we can even find a better representational correlate than pictures for sound; hint: recordings maybe?).<br />
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Well, clearly, hearing doesn't immediately represent all of the same properties as vision. And neither does vision represent all of the same properties as hearing.<br />
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However, that doesn't need to stop us from thinking of hearing as presenting an auditory "picture," at least if we understand "picture" as picking out a general representational structure that is in some way common to normal, physical pictures and our mental, visual images. After all, as we said before, we can think of the visual image as a picture representing such properties as {OBJECT, SHAPE, LOCATION, MOTION, CHANGE, COLOR, DISTANCE, SPACE, TEXTURE, CAUSE, AGENCY}. But then maybe we can also think of hearing as giving us an auditory representation, structurally similar to the visual image, but instead representing such features as {OBJECT, LOCATION, MOTION, CHANGE, DISTANCE, SPACE, CAUSE, VOLUME, PITCH, TIMBRE}. We might even be able to include SHAPE and AGENCY in there in some cases (almost certainly in the case of bats), though I'd have to double-check the scientific literature.<br />
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In other words, the perceptual "structure" could remain the same between visual perception and auditory perception, and indeed, some of the qualities that are represented in vision may be represented in hearing, and vice versa. For instance, just from what I've listed, the intersection of properties represented in hearing and vision will include such features as {OBJECT, LOCATION, MOTION, CHANGE, DISTANCE, SPACE, CAUSE). On the other hand, maybe it is unique to vision to include {COLOR, TEXTURE}, and maybe it is unique to hearing to include {VOLUME, PITCH, TIMBRE}.<br />
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But again, despite the differences in features that are represented in hearing and vision, the overall representational structure might be, generically, the same at a certain level of abstraction.<br />
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What would be interesting would be to work out a precise semantics for visual perceptions and a precise semantics for auditory perceptions and see where, in the details, the two actually differ. Obviously hearing and vision will have their accuracy conditions assigned by different systems of depiction. But it's exciting to think that the two might not be so far apart, that they may, structurally speaking, having a lot in common, and that light might be shed on both by looking at conventional, physical representations (such as pictures, recordings, etc.).awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-79803350537882973872016-02-18T11:17:00.003-08:002016-02-18T11:22:43.559-08:00Russell on Existence in TPLA III: The Argument from TransferabilityIn the <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2016/02/russell-on-existence-in-tpla-ii.html">last post</a> we explained what Russell's views on existence are and how they entail a "higher-order" theory of existence according to which existence is not a feature of individuals but of some "higher-order" things, viz. propositional functions. Since this is, initially, a very counter-intuitive proposal ("Socrates exists" is meaningless on Russell's view!), Russell ought to have some arguments to defend his view. This is going to be a long series of posts, so we'll discuss several of Russell's arguments from <i>The Philosophy of Logical Atomism</i>, but in the next two posts we'll discuss one of his arguments in particular: What I will call the "Transferability Argument." But before that I'll briefly mention Russell's motivation for having a theory of existence like his in the first place.<br />
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In the first place, the whole notion of existence comes up in connection with what we might call “negative existential” statements. A negative existential statement is a statement saying that something does not exist: For instance, that Socrates does not exist, or that dogs do not exist. These present an initial puzzle. On the one hand, if they are true, then it seems “Socrates” and “dogs” do not refer to anything, and so it’s not clear what could make the sentences true. On the other hand, they seem to be saying that something, “Socrates” or “dogs,” has the feature of “not existing.”<br />
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Now, this doesn’t immediately support Russell’s view on existence, but it does give one impetus to develop some sort of view that would address the question of negative existentials. It is interesting to see how Russell’s view deals with the problem. In the first place, ‘Socrates does not exist’ is simply meaningless according to Russell, since it doesn’t make sense to attribute existence to an individual, and so neither does it make sense to deny existence of an individual. On the other hand, since existence is a property of propositional functions, “dogs do not exist,” is easy to deal with: it is the same as saying ‘x is a dog’ is impossible. This involves no shady references to non-existent dogs or anything of that sort. One need only say that ‘x is a dog’ is never true.<br />
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With that said, it is not enough to point out that Russell’s view gives an answer to this question. Russell’s view is still prima facie implausible, and there might also be other positions available. Hence, Russell needs to give some direct arguments specifically for his view and arguments against alternatives. We will discuss just one of the arguments that Russell gives, which I call “the Transferability Argument.” The argument is quite subtle in fact, and it is rather complicated. But I think it is worth thinking through because it incorporates several interesting assumptions from logic and the philosophy of language.<br />
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Before delving into it, I want to define what we will call a ‘transferable predicate’. Russell does not use this terminology himself, but he uses the concept, and his argument is easier to state with this terminology. Now, a predicate F is transferable in my sense just in case (i) F can be meaningfully applied to some kind G, and (ii) for any kind G that F applies to, ‘G’s are F’ is true only if every individual x that is a G is also F. For instance, the predicate ‘green’ is transferable: It applies to a generic kind term like ‘men’, since we can say ‘men are green’, and ‘men are green’ is true only if each man is himself green. The predicate ‘green’ “transfers” to the individual men. The predicate ‘numerous’ on the other hand is non-transferable: While we can say ‘men are numerous’, it does not imply any particular man is himself numerous. Indeed, this last statement is meaningless.<br />
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With that said, Russell’s Argument from Transferability can be reconstructed as follows:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>(1’) ‘Unicorns exist’ is false, but meaningful. [Premise]</li>
<li>(2’) If there is an individual sense of ‘exists’, then ‘exists’ is transferable. [Premise]</li>
<li>(3’) If ‘exists’ is transferable, then ‘Unicorns exist’ implies ‘a exists’, for some proper name ‘a’ of some particular unicorn. [Premise]</li>
<li>(4’) So, if there is an individual sense of ‘exists’, then ‘Unicorns exist’ implies ‘a exists’, for some proper name ‘a’ of some particular unicorn. [By 2’ and 3’]</li>
<li>(5’) If ‘a’ is a proper name then ‘a is F’ is meaningful only if ‘a’ refers. [Premise]</li>
<li>(6’) So ‘a exists’ is meaningful only if ‘a’ refers. [5’, Universal Instantiation]</li>
<li>(7’) Suppose there is an individual sense of ‘exists’. [Supposition for Reductio]</li>
<li>(8’) Then ‘Unicorns exist’ implies ‘a exists’ for some proper name ‘a’ of some particular unicorn. [By 4’ and 7’]</li>
<li>(9’) If ‘unicorns exist’ is false, then ‘a’ does not refer. [Premise]</li>
<li>(10’) So ‘a’ does not refer. [By 1’ and 9’]</li>
<li>(11’) So ‘a exists’ is meaningless. [By 10’ and 6’]</li>
<li>(12’) No meaningful statement can imply a meaningless statement. [Premise]</li>
<li>(13’) So, ‘unicorns exist’ is meaningless. [By 8’, 11’, and 12’]</li>
</ul>
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But this contradicts our assumption in (1’). Hence, we must reject our assumption in 7’:<br />
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<ul>
<li>(14’) There is no individual sense of ‘exists’. [By 7’ – 13’ and Reductio ad Absurdum]</li>
</ul>
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This is an extremely interesting and rich argument. It is the best reconstruction I can give of Russell’s argument. The argument is clearly valid. It has a total of six premises: 1’, 2’, 3’ 5’, 9’, and 12’. I think it is useful to isolate the premises so that we can see precisely the principles at work here:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>(1’) ‘Unicorns exist’ is false, but meaningful.</li>
<li>(2’) If there is an individual sense of ‘exists’, then ‘exists’ is transferable.</li>
<li>(3’) If ‘exists’ is transferable, then ‘Unicorns exist’ implies ‘a exists’, for some proper name ‘a’ of some particular unicorn.</li>
<li>(5’) If ‘a’ is a proper name then ‘a is F’ is meaningful only if ‘a’ refers.</li>
<li>(9’) If ‘unicorns exist’ is false, then ‘a’ does not refer.</li>
<li>(12’) No meaningful statement can imply a meaningless statement.</li>
</ul>
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The first premise is uncontroversial I assume. The third premise seems to follow from the definition of ‘transferable’. 12’ also seems straightforward: If, by hypothesis, p is meaningful, then it does not imply anything meaningless, and this is just what 12’ says. That leaves 2’, 5’, and 9’ as the crucial premises.<br />
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I take it that the motivation behind 2’ is that if ‘existence’ is just another predicate of individuals, like ‘green’, say, then it should be transferable in precisely the way they are. After all, how could it be that ‘frogs are green’ is true but that ‘green’ does not transfer to all of the individual frogs? But if ‘exists’ is just like ‘green’ then it should behave in the same way.<br />
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5’ seems to be motivated by the fact that we are supposing ‘a’ to be a proper name in Russell’s sense. Recall that, according to Russell, a logically proper name is a word whose meaning just is a particular object; in other words, the proper name ‘a’ is meaningful only if, and because, ‘a’ refers. So if ‘a’ is meaningless, then the whole sentence ‘a is F’ will be meaningless too.<br />
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Finally, 9’ is motivated by the fact that if ‘unicorns exist’ is false then there simply aren’t any unicorns for ‘a’ to refer to, and so ‘a’ cannot have a reference.<br />
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On the face of it, there is some reasonableness about all of these premises. However, I think there are worries for all of them. In the next post I will try to raise some of those worries.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-6266577192976058712016-02-14T12:57:00.001-08:002016-02-14T12:57:57.142-08:00Geach on Good and Evil: Some Counterexamples?In Peter Geach’s paper “Good and Evil” Geach draws a distinction between attributive adjectives and predicative adjectives. An adjective A, as in the phrase “is an A B,” is predicative just in case the phrase can be broken down into “is a B” and “is A.” Otherwise A is attributive. For instance, “This is a sweet pastry” can be broken down into “This is a pastry” and “This is sweet.” So “sweet” is a predicative adjective. On the other hand “This is a small elephant” cannot be broken down into “This is an elephant” and “This is small,” so “small” is an attributive adjective.<br />
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Geach wants to argue for the thesis that “’good’ and ‘bad’ are always attributive, not predicative, adjectives.” I would like to bring up three intelligible, legitimate uses of the word “good” that are not obviously attributive, and suggest that they may provide counter-examples to Geach’s thesis. The first is what I will call “<b>comparative goodness</b>.” The second is what I will call “<b>relative goodness</b>.” The third is what I will call “<b>global goodness</b>.”<br />
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In the first case, consider the claim that it is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Or consider the claim that God is the greatest conceivable being and its apparent implication that it is even better than being a dissatisfied Socrates to be God. Both of these claims seem, on the face of it, intelligible. They may be open to dispute, but if they are open to dispute then that presupposes they are intelligible.<br />
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Now, ‘better’ and ‘greater’ are not, by themselves, the same word as ‘good’. But these claims presuppose that there is some scale of being according to which a satisfied pig is somewhere below dissatisfied Socrates, dissatisfied Socrates is presumably below satisfied Socrates, and satisfied Socrates is somewhere below God. Now, if we suppose, just for argument’s sake, that the satisfied pig is at the very bottom of the spectrum, and that God is at the very top, it seems intelligible to say that being satisfied Socrates – this being somewhere in the middle – is good. This is what I have called the “<b>comparative sense</b>” of goodness. But in this sentence, “Being satisfied Socrates is good,” there is not even another adjective for “good” to modify. Hence, this appears to be a case where “good” is used in a predicative sense.<br />
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The second case, which I have called “<b>relative goodness</b>,” is the type of goodness we have when something is good for something else. It is what we express by saying “X is good for Y.” For example, “This spaghetti is good for me,” or “my dog Paco is good for me.” It is interesting to note that both of these sentences might be true even if this spaghetti is neither good food nor good spaghetti and even if Paco is not a good dog. This spaghetti might be terribly undercooked. It might be incredibly cheap. But the relief it gives me may be enough to make it good for me. And Paco may be a crooked, maimed, and disobedient beast – hardly a good dog – but the licking he gives me at the end of the day makes him good for me still.<br />
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So things that are good in this sense can’t be likened to cases where I eat spaghetti and say “Oh, this is good!” In that case the adjective that “good” is supposed to modify is implicit (e.g., “Oh, this is good [spaghetti]!”). Whereas here it is not clear at all what the implicitly modified adjective would be; nor would it be clear what the meaning of such a construction might be (what does it mean to say “This spaghetti is good [spaghetti] for me”?); and as we’ve just shown, it is false that, in general, the F that is good for me is a good F (the spaghetti that is good for me need not be good spaghetti). So it doesn’t seem that “good” modifies any adjective in this case; so relative goodness seems predicative.<br />
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The third case is what I call “<b>global goodness</b>.” This is the type of goodness we attribute to whole facts or propositions. For instance: “It is good that God created the universe,” or “It is bad that animals suffer needlessly in factory farms.” Of course, these constructions could be turned into subject-predicate form too (that-p is good), in which case it will be clear that global goodness is prima facie predicative. Note that these are not just roundabout ways of saying “It is morally bad;” for even if nobody were responsible for the suffering of beasts – say, if they were harmed by some natural disaster – it would still be bad that they suffered (an objective tragedy, if you will).<br />
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But in these cases, it is not clear what the implicit adjective would be that “good” is supposed to modify. Should we say that-p is a bad <i>proposition</i>? This doesn’t seem to make much sense. Or that it is a bad <i>state of affairs</i>? This doesn’t seem to make much sense either: It’s not clear what counts as a good state of affairs or a bad one. States of affairs just are what they are. (If a state of affairs consists of an object having a property, as some philosophers say, then is a <i>good </i>state of affairs one where the object <i>really </i>has the property? Or maybe it must have the property <i>well</i>?). Besides, even if one did not believe there were states of affairs at all (an open question in metaphysics), one could still affirm that it is bad that animals needlessly suffer. This isn’t the case with genuinely attributive uses of “good,” since one cannot consistently believe “he is a good robber” and at the same time believe there are no robbers. Hence, this cannot be an attributive use of goodness. So this sense of “goodness,” global goodness, seems to be predicative: We can say, in a seemingly intelligible manner, “It is good that-p” or “that-p is good,” good simpliciter.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-38703525280593188442016-02-11T08:15:00.000-08:002016-02-18T11:24:13.359-08:00Russell on Existence in TPLA II: Russell's Second-Order View of ExistenceIn <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2016/02/russell-on-existence-in-tpla-i.html">my last post</a> I introduced the topic of Russell on existence. Now I'll deliver. Let’s see what Russell thinks.<br />
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First, it is helpful to understand some of Russell’s technical vocabulary. In particular, for our purposes, we should consider his notion of a name, of a definite description, of a proposition, and of a propositional function.<br />
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For Russell, a <b>logically proper name</b> (or, for short, just a <b>name</b>) is a word whose meaning is a <b>particular</b>, i.e., an individual object or entity. For instance, intuitively, the name “Socrates” directly denotes the particular object, Socrates. Or the name “Paco” directly denotes my Chihuahua, Paco. Now, this is simplifying a little bit, since Russell has a whole theory of what a particular is and which words actually are proper names, but this isn’t really essential to his account of existence. One could hold to views about existence that are basically the same as Russell’s even if one modified his account of particulars and the extent of the proper names.<br />
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What is important, however, is that proper names be contrasted with definite descriptions. A definite description is some phrase that is meant to describe a particular, unique individual. For instance “the Chihuahua that I have had since 6th grade” is a definite description. (As it turns out, it does successfully denote something: my dog Paco.) “The dragon flying above my head” is a definite description too, though to my knowledge it is one that does not refer to anything.<br />
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<b>Note</b>: Names are <i>not </i>definite descriptions and definite descriptions are <i>not </i>names. The meaning of a <i>name </i>is just the object it refers to; the meaning of a <i>definite description</i> includes all of the predicates mentioned in the description (for instance, in the last example, "dragon," "flying", and "above my head" are all part of the meaning of the description).<br />
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It is important to bring up this contrast between definite descriptions and proper names because Russell gives a separate account of existence statements for each. What we are interested in when talking about “individual existence” statements is existence statements whose subject term is a proper name. This is the type of existence statement Russell will say is meaningless.<br />
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A <b>proposition </b>for Russell is, in essence, something that can be asserted, or something that can be true or false. For instance, that it is raining is a proposition, or that Paco is black is a proposition. Once again, this is simplifying a bit, but the particular details of Russell’s views on propositions are not essential here.<br />
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Finally, there is the notion of a <b>propositional function</b>. Russell says that a propositional function is “any expression containing an undetermined constituent, or several undetermined constituents, and becoming a proposition as soon as the undetermined constituents are determined.” Examples include ‘x is a man’ or ‘n is a number’ or ‘(x+y)(x-y)=x2-y2’. So, if we were to “fill in the blanks” so to speak we would have a full proposition. For instance, replacing ‘x’ with ‘Paco’ gives the proposition that Paco is a man. Replacing 'n' with '2' gives the proposition that 2 is a number.<br />
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Russell's propositional functions can be <b>necessary</b>, <b>possible</b>, or <b>impossible</b>. Russell defines this as follows. A propositional function is:<br />
<ul>
<li><b>Necessary</b>, when it is <u>always true</u>;</li>
<li><b>Possible</b>, when it is <u>sometimes true</u>;</li>
<li><b>Impossible</b>, when it is <u>never true</u>.</li>
</ul>
Russell technically says that we have to take at least one of these locutions – “always true,” “sometimes true,” etc. – as undefined. But intuitively, “always true” means that every instance of the propositional function is true. For example, ‘x is x’ is a propositional function that is “necessary’ in Russell’s sense, since it is “always true,” whereas ‘x is a man’ is a propositional function that is possible but not necessary. These locutions are clearly not meant in a temporal sense.<br />
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(Interesting side-note: Obviously Russell's definition of "possible" and the like is not at all the definition we would immediately think of when we hear these words. What's interesting is that it's not clear whether he even meant to capture what we do with possible worlds semantics. He makes it explicit that he thinks previous thinking about modality is confused and problematic in some way, but it's not clear whether his discussion of modality is trying to capture some sort of traditional modal phenomenon as opposed to just making stipulations, nor whether his attitude toward traditional notions of modality is one of <i>revision </i>or <i>rejection</i>. Another interesting question: Is there any way to modernize Russell here? Is he on to anything at all? Anyway, enough of this digression...)<br />
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That brings us finally to Russell’s theory of existence. Russell’s official view is that “existence is a predicate of a propositional function.” In particular, if F is a type or kind of entity, then to say that F’s exist is just a shorthand way of saying that the propositional function ‘x is F’ is possible:<br />
<ul>
<li><b>(EXIST)</b>: F’s <b>exist </b>iff ‘x is F’ is possible (in Russell’s sense above).</li>
</ul>
For instance, dogs exist iff ‘x is a dog’ is possible. Or men exist iff ‘x is a man’ is possible.<br />
<br />
This makes Russell's view a "second-order" or "second-level" view of existence. If we think of individual objects or entities as the "first level" and we think of things that <i>apply</i> to individuals -- propositional functions -- as the second level, then existence is a property of things at the <i>second</i> level, since it is a property of propositional functions. Hence Russell's view has been variously described as a "second-order", "higher-order", or "higher-level" view of existence.<br />
<br />
So, according to Russell, “It is of propositional functions that you can assert or deny existence.” On the other hand, to say of a particular thing in the world that it is exists or not is “strictly nonsense.” After all, it doesn’t make sense to say of a particular object a that it is “possible” or “sometimes true.” Hence, individual existence statements are meaningless.<br />
<br />
This is of course rather shocking on the face of it. We seem to make true individual existence claims all the time. But on Russell’s view, “John exists” isn’t simply false. It isn’t even a loose way of speaking. It’s simply <i>nonsense</i>. Moreover, the seemingly indubitable inference from “I think” to “I exist” is not invalid on this view; it isn’t even an argument, since arguments have to have propositions as their conclusions, and “I exist” isn’t even a comprehensible thought. What one might have thought incorrigible turns out to be unintelligible.<br />
<br />
Nonetheless, as repugnant to common sense as this might seem at first, common sense is not infallible. And to be fair, we have only laid out Russell’s views and have not presented his arguments for them. In the next post I'll consider some of the reasons why, exactly, Russell might have come to this conclusion.<br />
<br />
[Part III is <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2016/02/russell-on-existence-in-tpla-iii.html">here</a>!]awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-48319010192494235912016-02-10T07:18:00.004-08:002016-02-18T11:21:34.648-08:00Russell on Existence in TPLA I: Why Care?In the next few posts I'm going to talk about Bertrand Russell's views on existence as one finds them in his <i>The Philosophy of Logical Atomism</i> (TPLA for short). (Note: I have already written the posts, so I will actually deliver!)<br />
<br />
In TPLA Bertrand Russell offers a brief but intriguing account of the notion of existence. Russell holds forcefully to the view that existence cannot be said to apply to individual objects – at least, not without descending into nonsense. According to Russell we cannot meaningfully say this or that <i>particular thing</i> exists; instead, only <i>types</i> or <i>kinds</i> of things can be said to exist.<br />
<br />
I will first try to make clear what, exactly, Russell’s views on the matter of existence are, at least insofar as he talks about it in TPLA, and I will clarify his technical terminology along the way. I will then attempt to lay out what are, so far as I can tell, Russell’s arguments for his views, as well as some of the problems concerning existence that motivate him to have a view in the first place. After questioning the soundness of Russell’s arguments I will lay out an alternative view that deals with some of the problems of existence he has identified. This alternative view of existence is more similar to that held by the majority of people before him, including the medieval Scholastics. Ironically, it turns out that this view is actually similar to some of what Russell says about propositions and propositional functions (as well as his own earlier view before TPLA).<br />
<br />
Before I begin, however, I’d like to explain why I think it is worthwhile to think about Russell’s views on existence and to bother to critique them. After all, Russell gave the Lectures for TPLA nearly a hundred years ago, and hardly anyone would agree with the precise details of his account of existence (let alone his general metaphysic).<br />
<br />
It is probably true that Russell’s precise views are not generally accepted, and arguably parts of his technical “machinery” are archaic. Nevertheless, Russell’s spirit lives on. Russell’s claim that existence is not a predicate of individuals and that existence should ultimately be defined in a “higher-order” way, in terms of quantification, has been widely accepted by many prominent philosophers. Indeed, the slogan that “existence is what is expressed by ‘existential quantification’” is standard orthodoxy nowadays. (See, for instance, Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic sec. 53, Quine’s “On What There Is,” C.J.F. Williams’ What is Existence?, and Peter van Inwagen’s “Being, Existence and Ontological Commitment,” just for a few examples.)<br />
<br />
So, aside from the fact that Russell was a great thinker, and the general guideline that it is worthwhile to interact with great thinkers, we should think about his views on existence because views like his are held in one form or another even today.<br />
<br />
[Part II is <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2016/02/russell-on-existence-in-tpla-ii.html">here</a>.]awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-11621729755385801392016-01-24T19:43:00.002-08:002016-01-24T19:45:55.396-08:00Two New Papers: Aristotelian Structuralism/Metaphysics of IneffabilityI just wanted to call to the attention of any readers that I've put up two papers from last semester! One is on the philosophy of mathematics, and the other is on the metaphysics of ineffability. I made a couple of posts about these issues (e.g., <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2015/10/review-aristotelian-realist-philosophy.html">here</a> and <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2015/10/ineffability-serious-threat-to.html">here</a>) and these are my more considered thoughts after a semester of reflection.<br />
<br />
The first paper is a general overview of an Aristotelian version of structuralism. That paper is <a href="https://www.academia.edu/19661154/Basics_of_Immanent_Structuralism">here</a>. In that paper I try to lay out as clearly as possible what the view is, and lay out some of the arguments and examples that support the view. Some might find the discussion and argument concerning what I've called "mathematical treating-as" to be interesting. To be honest, I find the view quite compelling.<br />
<br />
I wasn't able to come up with a uniform semantics for this view in time to make it perfectly polished, though I do know what I want to say about this now (hopefully more about this in future posts/papers). I am pretty confident now that a uniform semantics for Aristotelian-type structuralism can be given.<br />
<br />
The second paper (<a href="https://www.academia.edu/19559027/Ineffability_Without_Propositions">here</a>) is on the metaphysics of ineffability. I talked about this problem <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2015/10/ineffability-serious-threat-to.html">before</a> and was puzzled then. I remain puzzled now. But I feel that I've got a good grasp about what types of ineffability there are and what types of arguments can be given for each. My paper basically identifies several types of ineffability, and defends a substantive version of ineffability against an "idealist" type argument that was conceived by my professor, Thomas Hofweber. I felt quite pleased with this paper by the end of it; it's a very interesting topic and the paper is filled with lots of arguments and examples (hopefully some of them are good!).<br />
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If anyone has any thoughts on all of these feel free to comment or shoot me an e-mail!awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-59217497507126203572016-01-17T14:54:00.004-08:002016-01-17T14:54:42.544-08:00Quote: Milton Friedman: Free-Market Fundamentalist?Hardly. Despite his general skeptical tendency with respect to expansive government fiscal policy, Friedman acknowledges both the necessity and the success of several government functions in the service of the common good.<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"There have been some exceptions [to the general failures of the government's discretionary fiscal and monetary policy]. The expressways crisscrossing the country, magnificent dams spanning great rivers, orbiting satellites are all tributes to the capacity of government to command great resources. The school system, with all its defects and problems, with all the possibility of improvement through bringing into more effective play the forces of the market, has widened the opportunities available to American youth and contributed to the extension of freedom. It is a testament to the public-spirited efforts of the many tens of thousands who have served on local school boards and to the willingness of the public to bear heavy taxes for what they regarded as a public purpose. The Sherman antitrust laws, with all their problems of detailed administration, have by their very existence fostered competition. Public health measures have contributed to the reduction of infectious disease. Assistance measures have relieved suffering and distress. Local authorities have often provided facilities essential to the life of communities. Law and order have been maintained [...]" (<i>Capitalism and Freedom</i>, p. 199)</blockquote>
I'm not sure what my economic views are, but Friedman's reasonableness is one of the reasons I take him very seriously. He certainly does not fit into the mold of some of his more radical libertarian and anarcho-capitalist colleagues.<br />
<br />
Friedman's government is hardly the "night-watchman" state of Nozick, let alone the complete absence of any state as the anarcho-capitalists would have it. Friedman's state collects plenty of taxes, provides ample national defense, breaks up monopolies, maintains a safety net for the poor, directs monetary policy, uses fiscal policy (generally, tax policy) to regulate and influence industry, and even provides several public services for the sake of the common good in cases where the market fails or would be inefficient in doing so; and in fact Friedman admits that he is, in principle, open toward even more government intervention than this, though he happens to be skeptical as to its actual prospects. As such, it would hardly be fair to call him a "fundamentalist" defender of the free market in any meaningful sense.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-83597580405768031782015-11-24T05:36:00.001-08:002015-11-24T13:54:38.259-08:00Defending the New Natural Law's Incommensurability ThesisNew Natural Law (NNL) usually gets a bad rap from certain Thomists due to its embracing the "incommensurability thesis." I'll first explain the basic outline of NNL. I'll then explain the incommensurability thesis, and present an argument for it that I find quite convincing. Finally, I'll defend incommensurability from a common objection, and actually show how the objection favors incommensurability. Hopefully my defense will help illustrate the intuitiveness of the thesis.<br />
<br />
First, a little explanation of NNL. NNL derives specific moral/practical norms by positing two things:<br />
<ul>
<li>(1) <u><b>A set of basic goods</b></u>--things that are <b>intrinsically good/valuable/worthwhile</b> for humans to pursue. So, they are <b>always</b> "worthy of pursuit." In other words, they are always "to-be-pursued." Also, the basic goods can make <b>immediately intelligible</b> one's action, and are thus <b>reasons for action</b>. This is very important: The basic goods are the fundamental reasons for action; the fundamental "building blocks" of practical rationality. Examples include knowledge, life, friendship, aesthetic experience, and excellence in play.<br /><br />Let's consider an example. For instance, suppose you ask me, "Why are you running?" and I say, "To help my heart get stronger," to which you reply, "Why do you want to make your heart stronger?" If my answer is, "For the sake of my health, that I might live and live to the full," then this is a "question-stopper;" you can immediately see why I might want to do this, and thus health is a reason for acting that makes my action immediately intelligible; it immediately "make sense." This is because acting for the sake of someone's health is intrinsically valuable and worth doing.<br /><br />This is the first part of NNL: There is a set of basic goods, as defined above.</li>
<li>(2) <b><u>A set of principles of practical reasonableness</u></b>--these are <b>principles</b> or <b>rules</b> that tell us how it is <b>reasonable</b> to respond to instances of the basic goods. Examples include the golden rule, the prohibition against directly intending to harm a basic good for the sake of something else, rules against arbitrarily discriminating against the goods of certain people, the rule of being reasonably efficient in how one pursues one's plans, etc.</li>
</ul>
So, we start out with a list of things that are intrinsically <b>good for us</b> to pursue, and then there are rules that tell us how it is <b>reasonable for us</b> to go about pursuing them. The list of goods, in conjunction with the rules for practical reasonableness, ultimately tell us what actions are <b>permissible </b>as well as what actions are obligatory. They tell us what we may <b>permissibly</b> do, as well as what we <b>ought</b> to do. These rules are taken to be constitutive of practical reasonableness; they are supposed to follow from the very nature of practical rationality.<br />
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Much more needs to be said here obviously. Many books have been written. However, I don't need to get too much into the details of this for the sake of my post here. That's just the basic idea.<br />
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Now, one of the ideas about the basic goods that motivates some of the principles of practical reasonableness is the incommensurability thesis. Here is the <b>thesis of incommensurability</b>:<br />
<ul>
<li><b>(INC)</b> For each basic good x, it is not the case that x offers all the goodness ("to-be-pursuedness") of some other basic good and more.</li>
</ul>
See, for instance, Christopher Tollefsen's <a href="http://lyceumphilosophy.com/?q=node/97">helpful paper</a>. NNL theorists use the incommensurability thesis to present what I think is one of the strongest arguments against consequentialism of any sort.<br />
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Now, the motivation for the incommensurability thesis, as I've stated it, is that it seems that each good is beneficial to humans in a way which none of the other goods is. It has a unique type of goodness. Health is good for us in a way that knowledge is not, which is good for us in a way that friendship is not, and so on. If on the other hand we supposed the contrary of incommensurability, then some basic good x would offer all the goodness and more of some other basic good, say y. But then it's hard to see how y could make one's action immediately intelligible (which is part of the definition of a basic good). After all, if someone says, "I did this action for the sake of y," then in some circumstances you can reasonably say, "Well, you should have acted for the sake of x instead, since it offers all the goodness and more of y. So why didn't you?" In which case y would not be a basic good, since acting for the sake of y should make one's action immediately intelligible, and in this case it doesn't. But that's a contradiction, since we assumed y is a basic good. So the incommensurability thesis is true.<br />
<br />
Now, one objection is that it seems we should be able to prioritize the goods. Religion is more important than life, life is more important than knowledge, knowledge is more important than fun, and so on. This seems plausible to some. But, if NNL is right, none of these can be "weighed" against the others, since none of them offers all the goodness of any of the others and more. So, the objection goes, if incommensurability holds, then we can't prioritize the goods.<br />
<a name='more'></a><br />
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Now, as far as prioritization of goods, that can mean a number of things. If on the one hand talk of prioritization means that some (basic) goods are intrinsically better than others, then it seems this surely must contradict the incommensurability thesis. (Though even here I'm not sure; maybe there's a standard of "better than" which is not based upon having all the goodness and more of another? I don't know.)<br />
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If, however, it means that there is no correct way to choose at any given moment between different instances of basic goods, that certainly is not true, and it doesn't follow from incommensurability.<br />
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For instance, consider the classic case where I am playing chess and a child is drowning outside. If life and play are incommensurable basic goods, then it seems NNL is committed to saying I can permissibly keep playing chess even though there's a child drowning right outside my window.<br />
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The NNL response is to respond that to keep playing chess would be unreasonable not because the good of life is <i>commensurable </i>and <i>greater than</i> the good of play, but rather because I would violate some <i>principle of practical reasonableness</i> which dictates I rationally should save the child.<br />
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One way to do this, in terms of grave harms and minor goods, has been suggested by my friend <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucla.edu/graduate-students/170-michael-skiles-.html">Michael Skiles</a>. I should note that the solution hasn't been formulated by other NNL theorists this way, but it seems a reasonable way to go, and I don't see anything in it that contradicts anything else NNL theorists have said.<br />
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Skiles suggests that the principle of reasonableness in play would be that choosing some goods over others might cause or allow grave harm to other people, and it'd be unreasonable for that reason to choose the good that leads to grave harm (since it's unreasonable to allow grave harm to others by one's choice of a minor good, when not choosing that good would have easily prevented such grave harm). By grave harm is meant harm such that it would prevent someone from living a reasonably fulfilled life. Harms can of course be more or less grave by this definition. So, in this case, I'd be allowing a grave harm to the child even though I could have easily prevented this by giving up a minor good (the playing of chess). Thus, I am being unreasonable if I do not get up and save the child, and thus I rationally ought to save the child.<br />
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Now, you might think that what I've just said contradicts the incommensurability thesis. After all, I'm now saying that instances of basic goods can be classified as "minor and great," and also that we can speak of "grave harm and minor harm." The problem with this objection is that, again, incommensurability, as defined by NNL, doesn't in itself say that there is <i>no </i>sense in which we can prioritize the goods. On the contrary, it would be very unreasonable to choose a game of chess over saving a kid outside from drowning! It's just that NNL would account for this by appealing to <i>principles of practical reasonableness</i>, such as the one I cited, and not by appealing to the idea that some basic goods offer all the goodness and more of the other. I will call the principle of practical reasonableness that gets us this result <b>(HARM)</b>:<br />
<ul>
<li><b>(HARM)</b> It is unreasonable to allow grave harm to others by one's choice of a minor good, when not choosing that good would have easily prevented such grave harm."</li>
</ul>
To show that none of this commits us to thinking any basic good has all the goodness and more of the others, let's spell out more what this talk of grave harm and minor good amounts to.<br />
<ul>
<li><b>(GG)</b> An instance of a basic good counts as a <b>grave good</b> for a person if the having of that good would determine whether that person lives a reasonably fulfilled life. </li>
<li><b>(MG)</b> An instance of a basic good counts as a <b>minor good</b> if it is not a grave good. </li>
<li><b>(GH)</b> A harm counts as a <b>grave harm</b> if it is a privation of a grave good. </li>
<li><b>(MH)</b> A harm counts as a <b>minor harm</b> if it is not a grave harm.</li>
</ul>
So, in terms of what I'm calling in this (somewhat gerrymandered) terminology a grave good, the child's being saved from drowning (an instance of health) is a grave good for that child, since if the child is not saved he will obviously not be able to live a reasonably fulfilled life. So if the child is not saved, he will suffer a grave harm.<br />
<br />
Now, note that these definitions do not say anything about one good having all the goodness and more of any of the others, so prioritizing based on the "gravity" of the instances of the goods doesn't contradict incommensurability (since, as I said before, all incommensurability says is that none of the basic goods offers all the goodness and more of the others). So, this seems to present us with a legitimate way of getting the right conclusion of the case.<br />
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With that said, I want to raise an objection to the objector. Suppose that we modify the case a little bit, so that I'm playing chess against a computer that has the power to destroy all our knowledge and all our sources of knowledge, and will do so if I lose. In fact, why not throw all the beauty in there as well; if I lose, the computer will destroy all our knowledge and vaporize everything that's beautiful in this world. It's not entirely obvious to me that I rationally <i>must </i>stop playing chess to save the child. It will be a tough choice of course, but if we can prioritize the goods by saying life offers all the goodness of knowledge and more then it's not obvious why this would be a tough choice; it would seem to decisively deliver the false conclusion that I must stop playing chess.<br />
<br />
Admittedly, we might conclude that even in this case we still rationally ought to save the child. But then I think it would still be because a proper instance of <b>(HARM)</b>, along with some other principles of practical reasonableness, will deliver this verdict. And we still have to account for the intuition that it is no longer as obvious that we must do this. If the basic goods are incommensurable, then we can still at least account for the non-obviousness of our obligation to save the child. If they are commensurable, it's not clear how to account for this.<br />
<br />
So, in sum, it seems that this argument against incommensurability doesn't work, since arguably NNL can account for our intuitions on these cases just as well as (and, actually, even better than!) people who deny it.<br />
<br />
One final worry I'd like to mention: You might think that NNL solves the issue by arbitrarily positing principles of practical reasonableness that deliver the right verdicts. I would reply that first off, they are not arbitrarily posited, but argued for based on the nature of the basic goods and on the nature of rationality. See the work of Finnis, Grisez, Boyle, George, Tollefsen, Rhonheimer, and Murphy, among others. Second, though intuitions might guide the precise formulation of principles, they ultimately are argued for and shown to hold for independent reasons. Finally, if any moral oughts are also rational oughts, i.e. it is sometimes irrational to not do what is morally obligatory, then everyone must have some principles of practical reasonableness that connect the two. For instance, on the view I've been attacking, it seems the relevant principle would be something like this:<br />
<ul>
<li><b>(COMM)</b>: It is unreasonable to choose an instance of a basic good x over a basic good y if y offers all the goodness and more of x.</li>
</ul>
<div>
Everybody must choose some principles of practical reasonableness. One thing that distinguishes NNL from other views is which ones they choose, and I think this is what makes NNL so powerful a system.</div>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-12609209726745242462015-11-06T10:45:00.000-08:002015-11-07T23:20:55.634-08:00External Reasons: A Natural Law Response to WilliamsIn <a href="http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2015/11/bernard-williams-on-internal-reasons.html">my last post</a> I criticized Bernard Williams' rather Humean argument in "Internal and External Reasons" for arguing that external reasons can't explain action. As a follow up, I wanted to post my paper I wrote for the meta-ethics class I'm taking where I criticize further Williams' argument against externalism, and at the same time build up a natural law account of reasons and practical rationality in opposition to Williams. Here it is!<br />
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> In “Internal and External
Reasons,” Bernard Williams presents an argument for thinking that external
reasons do not exist, and thus all external reasons statements are false.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
In this paper I will do three things. First, I will explain what Williams
understands internal reasons and external reasons to be. I will then explain
Williams’ argument against external reasons. Finally, I will attempt to give
some defense of external reasons by critiquing Williams’ argument.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> The general form of a
reasons statement is “A has reason to do F in circumstances C.” Williams aims
to show that statements of this form are only ever true on an internal
interpretation. While Williams does not seem to give a <i>definition</i> of internal reasons statements, he does lay out what
seems to be a necessary condition on internal reasons statements. He says that
any internal interpretation of a reasons statement must “display a relativity
of the reason statement to the agent’s subjective motivational set,” which we
shall call “S.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
Roughly then, internal reasons for an agent are dependent on what is in the
agent’s subjective motivational set.<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn3" title="">[3]</a></span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn3" title=""><!--[endif]--></a></span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Williams also lays down as
a necessary condition on internal reasons that they can be discovered by
deliberative/practical reasoning.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
While Williams does not explicitly define what deliberative or practical reasoning
is, he specifies his conception of deliberative/practical reasoning via
example. In particular, he says that practical reasoning includes means/end
reasoning about the most preferable way of satisfying a desire, temporal
ordering of when to satisfy which desires, determining which desires one is
most interested in satisfying, and determining what would constitute
satisfaction of one’s desires. So, this condition amounts to saying if A has an
internal reason to F, A must be able to motivate herself to F by a process of
reasoning of this sort (from S).<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn5" title="">[5]</a></span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn5" title=""><!--[endif]--></a></span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><br /></span></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> It is clear then that
Williams is working with an idea of internal reasons that ties them closely to
an agent’s current subjective motivational set. It is also clear that he is
working with a “thin” notion of practical rationality. Since Williams doesn’t explicitly
define what he takes rational deliberation to be, it is difficult to precisely
state what this “thin-ness” amounts to. However, roughly speaking, Williams’
account of rationality is “thin” insofar as, on his view, a decision will count
as rational to the extent that it could be concluded to by a process of
deliberation starting from one’s desires and satisfying certain (relatively
weak) formal constraints.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"></span></div>
<a name='more'></a><br />
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> What about external reasons then? One thing
that is clear is that if A has an external reason to F in C, then A has this
reason independent of her motivational set S.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
On the other hand, Williams holds that all reasons for action must at least be
possible explanations for actions, and this applies to external reasons too. While
there is a lot more one might think about external reasons for action, these
assumptions are enough to get Williams’ argument off the ground. Any
externalist view of this sort will be susceptible to Williams’ argument.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Let us turn to Williams’
argument then. Williams’ argument has two parts. In the first part, Williams
argues that external reasons cannot by themselves help explain anyone’s action.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">1’. If R can be an external reason for action, then either R by itself
can help explain A’s acting in O or R by itself cannot help explain A’s acting
in O. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">2’. If R by itself can help explain A’s acting in O, then R by itself
must be able to motivate A. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">3’. So if R can be an external reason for action, then either R by
itself must be able to motivate A, or R by itself cannot help explain A’s
acting in O. [1’, 2’ CD & HS]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">4’. If R can be an external reason for action then R by itself cannot
motivate A. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">5’. So, if R can be an external reason for action then R by itself
cannot help explain A’s acting in O. [3’, 4’ DS & HS]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">The first premise
follows from the law of excluded middle. The second premise is Williams’ own
view, namely that “nothing can explain an agent’s (intentional) actions except
something that motivates him so to act.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
The premise in line 4’ is meant to follow from the fact that if agents have
external reasons they have them independent of their motivations. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Now, if the argument does
in fact show that external reasons cannot by themselves explain an agent’s
action, then any external reason statement will require some <i>additional</i> fact to help explain the
agent’s action. Williams takes it that the externalist’s best bet is to appeal
to an agent’s <i>belief</i> about what she
judges herself to have reason to do.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
This leads to the second part of Williams’ argument, which shows that external
reasons don’t exist.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> On Williams’ view, in
order for a belief to be able to explain an agent A’s action, when the belief
is acquired it must also generate a motivation in A. Presumably Williams
assumes this because he thinks beliefs by themselves cannot motivate, and can
thus explain only via the explanatory power of any motivations they produce.
Moreover, for a belief about external reasons to explain an agent A’s action,
it must be that A acquires the motivation <i>because</i>
of her belief. Finally, Williams assumes that, on an externalist view, if A correctly
deliberates to the conclusion that she has external reason to do F, then A will<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
come to believe she has external reason to do F.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> All of this, Williams
concludes, commits the externalist to thinking there is a necessary connection
between external reasons and motivation. In particular, he thinks the
externalist is committed to the premises of the following argument.<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn10" title="">[10]</a></span></span><a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn10" title=""><!--[endif]--></a></span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><br /></span></span></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">1. If A has external reason to F in C then if A were to rationally
deliberate in C, then A would be motivated to F. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">2. Given that were A to rationally deliberate in C she would be
motivated to F, then there is some motivation in S for A to deliberate to F
from. [Premise] <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">3. So, if A has external reason to F in C, then there is some motivation
in S for A to deliberate to F from. [3,4 HS]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: 150%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">4. But there is no motivation in S for A to deliberate to F from.
[Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">5. So, A has no external reason to F in C. [3,4 MT]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Hence, any external
reason statement must be false.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Premise 1 is meant to
follow from Williams’ points mentioned above. Roughly: If correct deliberation
implies belief in external reasons, and such belief implies<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
motivation, then if one were deliberating perfectly one would be motivated to
do what one has external reason to do. Premise 2 seem to follow from Williams’
understanding of rationality: Again, rational deliberation is to be
characterized in the “thin” sense explained above, as obeying a certain set of
formal constraints which are defined relative to one’s subjective motivational
set S. Finally, I take 4 to follow from Williams’ understanding of what an
external reason would be; it must be possible for an external reason statement
to be true independent of a given agent's motivational set S.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> As should be clear by now,
Williams has laid out a rather complex argument against externalism. There are
a number of places where the argument is open to potential objection (e.g., in
the characterization of externalism, or in the first part of the argument).
However, for the purposes of this paper I will only focus on the second part of
Williams’ argument (i.e., 1 – 5, along with the paragraphs immediately before
it). This is where I hope to critique his argument.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> I think an externalist
resisting this argument should question premise 1. Note that when Williams
speaks of “rational deliberation” here, he has in mind the same “thin” sense of
rationality and deliberation described above. On this view, very roughly, an
action counts as rational to the extent that it best contributes to satisfying
one’s desires and satisfies certain formal constraints.<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"> <a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></a>
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></a>
</span>This is why premise 2 is plausible: If perfectly rational deliberation
would make one motivated to F, then there must be some current desire whereby
one could “get” to F via perfectly rational deliberation. Let us call this
sense of practical rationality “thin-rationality” or “t-rationality.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> However, if 1 is to be
read according to <i>this</i> interpretation
of rationality, then no externalist should accept it. For we could then
re-phrase 1 as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">1*. If A has external reason to F in C then if A were to t-rationally
deliberate in C, then A would be motivated to F. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">However, clearly externalists
would not want to accept 1*. For one, once it is being made explicit that we
have t-rationality in mind, there is no guarantee that mere t-rational deliberation
will motivate one to do what one has external reason to do. I can have external
reason to F even if I have a set of desires according to which I could not
t-rationally deliberate to F from those desires.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Moreover, it seems that external
reasons are not only supposed to exist independently of a <i>particular</i> agent’s desires; they are supposed to be independent of
the desires of <i>any</i> agent in those
circumstances.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
But it is plausible that even if <i>some</i>
agents could become motivated to F by perfect t-rational deliberation, it
doesn’t follow that <i>any</i> agent in
those circumstances could. For instance, someone might start off with radically
different and deviant desires than someone else. So, if 1 is read under this
interpretation then 1 builds into the concept of ‘rationality’ something no
externalist would accept, viz., that external reasons are grounded in current
desires. Thus, no externalist should commit herself to 1; no externalist view
could imply this.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Of course, the internalist
has a reply to this: If t-rationality <i>is</i>
the only viable interpretation of rationality, making this the only type of
practical rationality there <i>is</i>, then the
internalist could say, “So much the worse for the externalist.” For the
externalist must be committed to <i>some</i>
version of 1 in <i>some</i> sense of
‘rationality’, and if no such version is true then externalism is false.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Granting that there must
be some interpretation of ‘rationality’ according to which 1 is true, the
challenge for the externalist becomes that of producing some coherent “thick”
conception of rationality that is (i) distinct from t-rationality, but is at
the same time (ii) a genuine conception of rationality. Call this
“Thick-rationality” or “T-rationality.” On such a conception of rationality,
satisfying the formal constraints of t-rationality are not enough to make a
decision rational. Rather, satisfaction of certain more substantive conditions
(for instance about the contents of one’s desires) is also necessary for a
decision to count as rational. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> If there is some
legitimate conception of rationality of this sort, the externalist can respond
that, when read in light of t-rationality, premise 1 is not plausible, and no
externalist should accept it. However, when read in light of T-rationality,
premise 1 <i>does</i> become plausible. The
argument gains its superficial plausibility then from an equivocation between t-rationality
and T-rationality; the reason 1 seems plausible at first sight is because there
is another, more “thick” understanding of practical rationality, according to
which 1 is actually true. Of course, this opens up the question: What is this
thick conception of rationality supposed to amount to, and is it coherent?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Before proceeding with
some suggestions about how this might go, I want to make two points about the
argument thus far. Consider the thesis that if A has reason to F, then if A is
perfectly rational she will be motivated to F. This is usually taken to be an
internalist constraint on what reasons for action are.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
But presumably what makes this a distinctively <i>internalist</i> constraint is that the understanding of rationality
here is one which is responsive to <i>internal</i>
reasons (of the sort Williams describes). Thus, insofar as this constraint is
meant to rule out externalism, this will turn on the understanding of
rationality here being suitably “thin.” But in that case the externalist could
respond by saying that the constraint as stated is true so long as we have a
suitably “thick” understanding of rationality, in which case the constraint
won’t rule out externalism. Thus, crucially, the internalist must argue that
there is no legitimate conception of rationality of this sort. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> But then there are two
points to note from this: First, the internalist is committed to there being no
legitimate notion of rationality other than the thin one; i.e., the <i>only</i> legitimate conception of
rationality is the “how-to-best-satisfy-my-desires” model.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
But one might worry that this is a rather broad and dogmatic claim – on the
face of it not very obvious – which will require quite a bit of heavy
argumentation (much more than Williams has given us).<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
Second, in that case, the internalist constraint is not <i>itself</i> what is doing the work against externalism, but rather
whatever objections an internalist might have to thick conceptions of
rationality. But then any argument against externalism purportedly making use
of this constraint is really no more (or less) forceful than whatever arguments
internalists have against thick conceptions of rationality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Let us turn to the thick
conception of rationality then. While I will obviously not be able to supply a
complete and thorough account of rationality here, I would like to do two
things. First, I would like to offer some evidence for thinking there is at
least <i>some</i> thick conception of
rationality that is legitimate. Second, I would like to give some outline of
what one such thick conception might look like. While this is certainly no
decisive refutation of Williams, it does present a challenge, since I think the
evidence I will offer regarding the first point is common-sensical and
ubiquitous, and the challenge for Williams will be to show that <i>any</i> thick conception of rationality
attempting to incorporate these facts is doomed. But then the outline of a
seemingly coherent picture of thick rationality suggests otherwise. This will
be enough to show that Williams’ work is cut out for him, and that much more
needs to be said than he has said here.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> First, (1) consider
someone who continues to smoke three packs of cigarettes a day, even though she
knows it is going to kill her. However, she really doesn’t care. It still seems
there is a sense in which we would say, “That’s stupid of her.” In other words,
to put it more nicely, it’s <i>unreasonable</i>.
(2) Consider also someone who likes to count blades of grass all day, and who
wouldn’t derive more pleasure from anything else (not that she derives a ton of
pleasure in the first place). There still seems to be a sense in which this is
an <i>unreasonable</i> way to live out one’s
life. (3) Consider next a person who has decided, to make a philosophical point
about the power of free will, that whenever he sees something he will lick it.
Suppose free will is so dear to him that carrying this out matters more than
anything else. Suppose eventually he gets so accustomed to this that after some
time he forgets about the free will stuff and just has an extremely strong
desire to lick things. Such a person still seems to exhibit <i>irrational</i> behavior. (4) Consider some
murderer who concludes that it’s okay to abduct and torture children for fun.
This seems quite an unreasonable conclusion. (5) Consider a principal who punishes
students for missing school even when dangerously ill. This is <i>unreasonable</i> of her. (6) Finally,
consider the following conversation: A: “You need to be nice to your wife; it’s
the right thing to do.” B: “But I don’t want to and I don’t care!” A: “That
doesn’t matter; you should be nice.” B: “Oh yeah? Why should I?” M: “Because
it’s the right thing to do.” This conversation strikes us as <i>felicitous</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> This all <i>seems right</i>. But none of these reasons
statements are clearly true when read internally, given a “thin” interpretation
of rationality (and the cases could probably be modified to make this even more
obvious). Of course, if the argument given by Williams goes through, they are
either false or are actually internal statements. But as we’ve seen, Williams’
argument is plausible <i>only insofar</i> as
he has some <i>additional</i> argument for
the incoherence of any thick conception of rationality. And in the absence of
that additional argumentation, the most straightforward way to read these reasons
statements is (a) externally, (b) relative to a non-thin (i.e., thick)
conception of rationality, and (c) as true. This is the prima facie evidence
for thinking there is at least <i>some</i>
legitimate sense of rationality which is “thick” rather than “thin.” For it
seems that we judge the actions and even desires of these people to be contrary
to reason, even if they cohere well with their actual subjective motivational
set.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> Now I’d like to outline a
possible account of what thick rationality consists in. While this will be
incomplete and imperfect, the fact that it is not obviously wrong seems to give
us at least <i>some</i> reason for thinking
that something in this direction could work. First, let’s clarify the notion of reasons for action. A reason for
performing F in circumstance C is some state of affairs or consideration that
could make performing F in C practically intelligible.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
This is why reasons for action can rationally <i>explain</i> one’s action. Let me illustrate what I have in mind via
example.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> If you found me in a chair
stabbing myself in the leg, you might ask me why I’m doing what I’m doing. “Does
your leg hurt? Is someone sadistically paying you to do this? Is this how your
tribe mourns the loss of loved ones? … ” Suppose to all such questions I responded,
“No, I just desire to stab myself.” This wouldn’t really answer your question.
There is still a clear sense in which what I’m doing is <i>unintelligible</i>, and wouldn’t make sense even if I obeyed some
bizarre psychological laws which led me to “just desire” to stab myself in the
leg. If however I said, “I am scared there is a tiny alien in my leg, and I
need to get it out so it doesn’t kill me,” I will at least have described some
state of affairs where, when my action is seen in light of this, my action does
at least become <i>intelligible</i> (even
if, in all likelihood, it is still utterly ridiculous and unreasonable). Such a
state of affairs is a reason for acting a certain way; it can explain my action
by <i>making it intelligible</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> If this is how we understand
reasons for action though, then it is not at all obvious that the only type of
thing that can be a reason for action is something suitably related to one’s
subjective motivational set. For on this account, R is a reason for doing F in
C just in case for some agent A, if A does F in C because of R, then A’s doing
F is intelligible. But it seems there are lots of things that could make someone’s
action intelligible that aren’t necessarily related by t-rationality to my
current desires.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
Doing things because they foster one’s health makes sense. Doing things because
they contribute to building lasting friendships makes sense. Doing things
because they help others to gain knowledge makes sense. Hence, these are
reasons for action, and they are reasons for action whether anyone has an
appropriate desire or not. Indeed, it seems that these things make our action
intelligible insofar as they are things that are <i>objectively</i> <i>good</i> for us;
and arguably whether something is objectively good for us is independent of our
desires and motivations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> The thick conception of
rationality I have in mind then is one defined in terms of appropriate
responses to reasons for action <i>in this
sense</i>, and in this sense facts about what is objectively good for us seem
to be capable of being reasons for action. Now, if facts about what is good for
us are legitimate reasons for action, then being perfectly rational must
consist at least partially in being motivated by what is objectively good for
us. But it is not clear one can always be motivated by t-reasoning from one’s
present desires to pursue what’s objectively good for oneself. So being
perfectly rational cannot consist in t-rationality, and thus there must be some
thick conception, T-rationality, which consists in appropriate responses to
reasons for action. While I obviously don’t have a fully worked out theory of
rationality here, it seems this provides a prima facie challenge to Williams.
Insofar as we have reason to think a thick conception of rationality like this is
coherent, Williams’ argument against external reasons doesn’t hold up.</span></div>
<br />
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<br />
<div id="ftn1">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>Technically, he argues that they are false, incoherent, or misleading
(and thus should instead be rephrased as internal reasons statements). See the
last paragraph of p. 297.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>This is found on p.292, bottom right paragraph.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>William does not explicitly list what is in this set, but roughly speaking
it consists of an agent’s desires <i>broadly</i>
<i>understood</i>. Examples include
“dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal
loyalties, and various projects …” He does however note explicitly that it does
<i>not</i> include “needs.” Cf. p. 294, top
right.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn4">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>On p. 293, bottom right.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>See p. 294, bottom right.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn6">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> “The whole point of external reason statements
is that they can be true independently of the agent’s motivations.” See p. 295,
top right.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>Cf. p. 295, top right.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>By “externalism” I of course mean the view that some external reasons
statements are true.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>Or at least <i>should</i>. The text
is a bit unclear on this I think. Williams uses the word “should,” but it’s not
entirely clear to me whether it is meant to have any normative force or just
denotes what would, in fact, happen according to externalism. I’m opting for
the latter interpretation, though I think it probably isn’t essential.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>For all of this, see the bottom left of p. 296. It is a little bit
difficult for me to see where Williams is getting all of his premises from, and
again I think some of his statements are ambiguous between different
interpretations of his use of “should,” but this seems to me the most
charitable and straightforward interpretation of his argument.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>Or at least <i>should</i> imply. Again,
I think the argument could be made to work on either interpretation of
Williams.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>Again, Williams certainly wouldn’t give an explicit definition of
rationality in this way. Williams is content to give a rough picture via examples.
Similarly, I am only giving a rough picture, by characterizing rationality in a
way that picks out something roughly similar to what Williams has in mind.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>By a “formal constraint” I mean, roughly, a constraint the spelling out
of which does not require essential reference to the particular contents of
one’s desires. For instance, “It is irrational to satisfy a weaker desire at
the expense of a stronger desire when each is equally easy to satisfy.” While
it may be false, this constraint counts as a purely “formal” constraint in the
sense I’m concerned with.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>For some related discussion, see Michael Smith, <i>The Moral Problem</i>, pp. 164–174.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>See, e.g., Smith, “The Externalist Challenge.” Moreover, arguably, the
only plausible internalist views will be ones which restrict the motivation to
rational agents in a way like this, and so have constraints similar to this
one.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>Again, this is a bit unfair because Williams wouldn’t put it so pithily,
but this is indeed <i>roughly</i> the
understanding of rationality Williams has in mind, and thus the only kind of
rationality internalists can accept as legitimate.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>One might also begin to worry about how much normative significance
practical rationality has if this is the only legitimate conception of
rationality. Philippa Foot worries that if having the desire to torture
children can be <i>perfectly rational</i>,
then what’s so important about practical rationality in the first place? Why is
practical rationality the most fundamental sense in which we can say we ought
to do something? Why do we tend to give it the status of a “master virtue?” See
Foot, Natural Goodness, pp. 62-63. One can take her argument further: If this
is the <i>only</i> sense in which something
can be rational, then practical rationality is not what <i>ultimately</i> normatively binds us at all; there will clearly have to
be something else, some other more fundamental sense in which we “ought” to do
certain things (which always rules out blatantly evil things, such as torturous
desires).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> This account is largely adapted from G.E.M.
Anscombe’s book <i>Intention</i>, sec. 37.
Roughly, in Anscombe’s terms, a reason for action is some “desirability
characterization,” i.e., some description which, when an action is intended
under that description, makes the action seem “desirable,” “worth doing,” or
“having a point.”<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Papers/Phil%20760%20Paper%202.docx#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> And conversely, as we saw by our example above,
the mere fact that someone desires something might not make it intelligible at
all.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
</div>
awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-39844761875345554862015-11-05T22:07:00.001-08:002015-11-05T22:07:23.102-08:00Bernard Williams on Internal Reasons (Contra Natural Law)<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Here is a short precis I wrote for my meta-ethics class about Bernard Williams' argument for internalism about reasons. Internalism about reasons is, roughly, the Humean-ish idea that an agent has a reason to act a certain way only if it is somehow grounded in the desires of the agent. This is directly contrary to the natural law view, according to which what is reasonable to do or not to do is independent of the desires of the agent, and thus reasons are independent of an agent's desires:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">In “Internal and External Reasons,” Bernard Williams presents an
argument for thinking there is a problem with external reasons statements.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">1.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">If something R can be
a reason for action, then R can be a reason for someone A’s acting on a
particular occasion O. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">2.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">If R can be a reason
for A’s acting on a particular occasion O, then R can figure in an explanation
of A’s acting in O. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">3.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">So, if R can be a
reason for action, then R can figure in an explanation of A’s acting in O. [1,2
HS]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">4.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">If R can figure in an
explanation of A’s acting in O, then R cannot be an external reason. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">5.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">So, if R can be
reason for action, then R cannot be an external reason. [3,4 HS]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">6.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">If R cannot be an
external reason, then R is an internal reason. [Premise]<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: 49.5pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: Cambria; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-latin; mso-fareast-font-family: Cambria; mso-fareast-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">7.<span style="font-family: "times new roman"; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">So, if R can be a
reason for action, then R is an internal reason. [5,6 HS]<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;">Hence, the argument establishes that the only coherent notion of a
reason for action is an internal reason for action, i.e., one which is relative
to an agent’s subjective motivational set S. For now, let us grant premises 1
and 6. I’d like to think about premises 2 and 4 a bit. My point will be that,
depending the sense of ‘explanation’ here, either one or the other premise will
be implausible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> First, let us
consider the interpretation of explanation where an explanation of an action is
something that (directly) motivates someone to do that action. In this sense,
maybe we should accept 4. For maybe it is only one’s desires, or at least
something closely bound up with one’s desires, that could explain an action in
the sense of being able to directly motivate it.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> However, in
this case, I think that premise 2 is implausible; for I don’t think that a
reason for acting in an occasion has to be able to motivate you. Rather, a
reason for performing P in circumstance C is some state of affairs or
consideration that could make performing P in C practically intelligible.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 11pt; line-height: 115%;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a>
And something can do this without being able to motivate. Let me explain.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> If you found
me in a chair stabbing myself in the leg you would ask me why I’m doing what
I’m doing. If I said to you, “I just desire to,” this wouldn’t really answer
your question. There is still a clear sense in which what I’m doing is
unintelligible, and wouldn’t make sense even if I obeyed some bizarre
psychological laws which led me to “just desire” to stab myself in the leg. If
however I said, “I am scared there is a tiny alien in my leg, and I need to get
it out so it doesn’t kill me,” I will at least have described some state of
affairs where, when my action is seen in light of this, my action does at least
become intelligible (even if, in all likelihood, it is still utterly ridiculous
and unreasonable). Such a state of affairs is a reason for acting a certain
way.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> But if this
is a correct account of what reasons for action are, then 2 seems false. For it
might be that a state of affairs S could make doing P intelligible, and thus
counts as a reason for doing P, but my subjective motivational set makes me
completely unable to even take S into consideration, and thus makes S unable to
motivate me. This happens all the time. For instance, suppose I have no desire
or motivation to quit smoking. However, the fact that smoking greatly increases
my chances of dying certainly could make the action of quitting intelligible
(i.e., if someone appealed to this fact when justifying their choosing to quit).
So the fact that smoking greatly increases my chances of dying is a reason to
quit. Yet, again, it might be that it couldn’t motivate me on any occasion.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "cambria" , "serif"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-latin;"> All of this
is to say that, on the interpretation of ‘explain’ where it is roughly
equivalent to ‘motivate’, premise 2 seems implausible. On the other hand, if
‘explain’ means ‘make intelligible’, then premise 2 seems true, but premise 4
seems false, at least if reasons for action are, as I’ve explained, states of
affairs which make acting certain ways practically intelligible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> The “problem” is either that they are false,
incoherent, or are misleading (and presumably should instead be rephrased as
internal reasons statements). See the last paragraph of p. 297.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> This is my interpretation of Williams’
argument at the bottom left paragraph of p. 295. I may be misinterpreting
Williams, but this seemed to me the best way to make his argument valid.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>I am assuming the sense of ‘can’ here means something along the lines of
‘is physically possible’.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="file:///C:/Users/Shannon/Desktop/Fall%202015/Phil%20760/Precis/Alfredo%20-%20Williams%20Against%20External%20Reasons.docx#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="IT" style="font-family: "calibri" , "sans-serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span lang="IT"> </span>This account is largely adapted from G.E.M. Anscombe’s book ‘Intention’,
sec. 37.<o:p></o:p></div>
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awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-25748136901749402752015-10-30T06:01:00.002-07:002015-10-30T06:03:56.634-07:00Ineffability: A Serious Threat to Ambitious MetaphysicsConsider a squirrel on a tree. There are things we can represent that are simply not within the capacity of the squirrel's mental structure to represent. For instance, we can represent complex mathematical truths about the shapes and physical relations obtaining in the squirrel's environment. Despite the fact that all these facts are "happening" right in his face, our little squirrel hasn't the slightest clue about them. And it's not just that he's ignorant about them like someone who doesn't know math or physics; it's that it's completely beyond a mind like his to even represent things like facts and propositions. They are completely ineffable to the squirrel.<br />
<br />
That all seems fair enough. But here's where things start to become worrisome: Why shouldn't we think that <i>we </i>are in relation to some possible being in the same way that the squirrel is related to us? (Or, if you believe in God, why not think that we are related to some <i>actual </i>being in the same way that the squirrel is related to us?) In other words, why not think that there are some aspects of reality that are completely ineffable to us, even if maybe they are effable with respect to some other, more advanced being? Why not think that there could be some species of creature who could comprehend things that are completely beyond our mind's capacity to even represent?<br />
<br />
This is not a new argument or anything. See for instance Ch. VI of Thomas Nagel's book '<a href="http://www.amazon.com/View-Nowhere-Thomas-Nagel/dp/0195056442/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1446207437&sr=8-1&keywords=the+view+from+nowhere">The View From Nowhere</a>'. Moreover, I'm sure many of us have thought of this possibility before. But do we really consider the implications of this argument? I know that I've thought of this before, but haven't drawn anything of significance from this. However, I'm realizing now that this is a very important and deep question.<br />
<br />
Note that this view seems to go hand in hand with the idea of metaphysical realism, which holds that there is an objectively existing world that is in some sense totally (or at least mostly) mind-independent. If you hold that view, it seems rather strange to think that somehow all of reality, of necessity, must be in principle comprehensible to us. And if reality were in its totality to be comprehensible to us it would be a rather strange coincidence. Moreover, there seems to be nothing particularly special about us. We are on a continumm with non-sentient creatures, insects, and squirrels on one side and with angels and God on the other (and probably a lot of things in between). Hence, it seems quite likely, on realism, that we are in a situation similar to that of the squirrel: There are aspects of reality which are simply beyond the representational capacities of our minds.<br />
<br />
But then there is trouble. Interestingly, those who have high hopes for metaphysics tend to be metaphysical realists, but that very same metaphysical realism tends to undermine the high hopes for metaphysics. For example, suppose we characterize metaphysics as the study of the most fundamental or general aspects of reality. Suppose moreover that we are metaphysical realists. Then, probably, there are aspects of reality which are simply beyond the representational capacities of our minds. But in that case, for all we know, the most fundamental or general aspects of reality are within the sphere of things that are completely ineffable to us. So there is reason to doubt the possibility of having any substantial metaphysical knowledge.<br />
<br />
In fact, maybe by a similar though distinct argument we can get a stronger conclusion. We have some reason to think that as minds become more advanced on the "great chain of being" that I've described, they become able to represent more (and more) fundamental aspects of reality than those before them. Higher beings have concepts that are more fundamental than those of the minds on lower levels. (Technically, they have concepts of <i>things </i>that are more fundamental.) And they probably have more of them. For instance, some lower animals can probably represent things like 'cause' and 'object' and even 'agent', but it seems doubtful whether bees could do the same (or to the same degree). But in that case, granted we are probably pretty far from the high end of the continuum, probably the most fundamental aspects of reality are only representable by beings on the higher end. So, probably, we cannot represent the most fundamental aspects of reality. So, probably, ambitious metaphysics is hopeless.<br />
<br />
This might seem like a fun philosophical puzzle, but actually it is rather important, because if I sit down and ask myself whether I really think metaphysical realism is true, I am with utter and literal sincerity inclined to say, "Yes." And if I sit down and ask myself whether I really think some aspects of reality are ineffable for the reasons described, I am with utter and literal sincerity inclined to say, "Yes." And, to bring the trilemma to completion, I have high hopes for metaphysics and sincerely think it is essential to truly understanding the world.<br />
<br />
What to do then? Does the argument against substantial metaphysics work? What are the implications for metaphysics and other areas of philosophy depending on which way one goes? How might different views solve the issues here? These are interesting questions. Since I've been thinking about this stuff for a class I'm taking, I'll probably have a chance to write a term paper on it. I have inklings about where we might go, but I have no clear answer at the moment.awatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.com3