So, I want to get a bit more clear on what the grounding objection to Molinism is saying. As far as I can tell at this moment, the grounding objection seems to go something like this.
The anti-Molinist says that some general statement about the relation between grounding and truth such as the following holds:
(A) If some proposition is true then there is an entity which grounds its truth.
It seems in this context 'grounds the truth of p' just means 'is the truthmaker of p'. The objector to Molinism then proposes:
(B) There could be no entity to ground the truth of CCF's.
Of course from A and B it follows that all CCF's, if they are meaningful, are necessarily false. Hopefully this is all a correct representation of the objection.
Showing posts with label grounding. Show all posts
Showing posts with label grounding. Show all posts
Sunday, August 25, 2013
Wednesday, July 3, 2013
Essence and Ontological Dependence
This is my term paper from my independent study last quarter on ontological dependence. I will say beforehand that I did not have enough time to make it great, and there is a lot more I could have said. However, I believe it contains a relatively good summary of Kit Fine's position, and I think the stuff toward the end about causation is somewhat original (albeit sketchy). So hopefully someone will find it interesting and useful.
I. Introduction – Examples and What We Want
In many areas of philosophy, as well as common discourse, it is normal to say that one thing depends on another. Moreoever, one of these uses of the word 'depends' is a distinctly ontological sense, as opposed to, say, a notion of epistemological dependence or logical dependence. I will use the term 'dependence' throughout this essay to stand for this particularly ontological notion, unless otherwise stated. So for instance, we might say that a composite depends on its constituents. Or we might say a smile depends on the mouth of which it is a smile. Or that a hole depends on the thing which it is a hole in. This is a philosophical datum and the only reason one would deny it or feign incomprehension seems to be hard-headedness.
I. Introduction – Examples and What We Want
In many areas of philosophy, as well as common discourse, it is normal to say that one thing depends on another. Moreoever, one of these uses of the word 'depends' is a distinctly ontological sense, as opposed to, say, a notion of epistemological dependence or logical dependence. I will use the term 'dependence' throughout this essay to stand for this particularly ontological notion, unless otherwise stated. So for instance, we might say that a composite depends on its constituents. Or we might say a smile depends on the mouth of which it is a smile. Or that a hole depends on the thing which it is a hole in. This is a philosophical datum and the only reason one would deny it or feign incomprehension seems to be hard-headedness.
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