Introduction:
What does God's omnibenevolence consist in? I think that we need to do a little more work on fully explaining what we mean by this. In fact I'm somewhat distraught, because it seems that if we affirm God's all-goodness we should already know what we're talking about. I think that some of the notions which are typically bound up with omnibenevolence really don't make sense.
In a post a while back I presented the Prussian Free Will Defense. I think the argument is sound. The conclusion that we end up drawing from it is the following. It will be important in determining what omnibenevolence can be and what it cannot be:
(C1) It is not the case that there is some moral principle in the nature of an omnibenevolent and omnipotent being which prevents him from creating a creature who does something immoral.
"Actualizing all possible goods":
I think it's relatively easy to understand omnipotence and omniscience. Omnipotence is just the ability to do all that is possible. Omniscience is just the knowing of all things. So does omnibenevolence consist in the actualizing of all good things?
I'm convinced that this notion is incoherent. (C1) shows that God's omnibenevolence is compatible with God's not actualizing worlds which he could have actualized in which all moral agents always freely choose to do the right thing. And that is certainly incompatible with God's omnibenevolence meaning that he actualizes all possible goods.
The idea that omnibenevolence means "actualizing every possible good" is probably in contradiction with the idea of omnipotence anyhow. One could think of two goods which are mutually exclusive but are both within the range of God's power. For example, my marrying Lucy and my marrying Edith are both goods which are mutually exclusive and possible for God to actualize. However, God can only bring about one of these. Hence, if God is omnipotent, he can't be omnibenevolent if that means that he actualizes every possible good; there are some goods which God could actualize but doesn't.
"Preventing all unnecessary evil":
It seems that the existence of an all-good being must preclude the existence of unnecessary evil. Responses to the problem of evil like Plantinga's Free Will Defense say that some evils which take place are justified by greater goods. But the atheist objects that there are some evils which are probably not justified by greater goods, and in general, the theist agrees that if this were true then an omnibenevolent God would not exist. The typical attempt to solve the problem is to claim that no evils are unnecessary.
But what if the theist were to take a different route and say that even if there were evils which could have been prevented that this doesn't rule out the existence of an all-good God? In fact, I think (C1) shows that this is true. For take again the possible world W1 in which all agents always freely choose to do what is good. (C1) shows that there is no moral principle in the nature of an omnibenevolent being which prevents him from actualizing a world W2 where an evil is committed even though he could have actualized W1 instead. But in that case, some of the evils which take place are unnecessary; they could have been prevented by God's actualizing W1.
A Problem:
So we see that, based on (C1), omnibenevolence cannot imply the actualizing of all possible goods. Neither does it imply the preventing of all unnecessary evils. Yet this seems to sap omnibenevolence of any real content. How could we call something "all-good" which allows needless suffering and withholds a great many good things from us?
To me this is a big problem. I want to find some possible ways in which we can understand omnibenevolence in light of these objections. Any thoughts?
Saturday, March 26, 2011
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
What Does It Take to Be An Atheist?
Consider some valid theistic arguments and what an atheist must do to deny their soundness.
Argument A - A Necessary Concrete Entity:
(1) Possibly a necessary concrete being exists implies a necessary concrete being exists.
(2) Possibly, a necessary concrete being exists.
(3) Therefore, a necessary concrete being exists.
Assume further that it can be shown that the necessary being is God.
What must the atheist do to deny this argument? (1) is just axiom S5. Therefore they must deny (2). This implies that (a) possibly nothing exists or (b) necessarily, there exists at least one contingent entity. This also implies that all concrete entities are contingent.
Atheist Theorem 1 (AT1): It is not possible that a necessary concrete being exists.
Atheist Theorem 2 (AT2): Either (a) possibly nothing exists or (b) necessarily there exists at least one contingent entity.
Atheist Theorem 3 (AT3): For any concrete entity x, x is contingent.
Disproving AT1, AT2 or AT3 is sufficient for refuting atheism.
Argument B - The Scotistic Cosmological Argument:
(1') Whatever is possible is contingent or necessary.
(2') A first cause is possible.
(3') Therefore, a first cause is contingent or necessary.
(4') Any contingent substance is possibly actualized by another substance.
(5') A first cause is not possibly actualized by another substance.
(6') Therefore a first cause is not contingent.
(7') Therefore, a first a cause is necessary.
What must the atheist do to deny this argument? The atheist can only really deny either (2) or (4).
Atheist Theorem 4 (AT4): Either (a) a first cause is impossible or (b) some contingent substance is not possibly actualized by another.
Hence, disproving this disjunction AT4 is sufficient for refuting atheism. Saying that (b) is false also leads to some interesting consequences about infinite regresses.
Argument C – A Modal Cosmological Argument:
(1*) Every contingent entity possibly has an external cause.
(2*) If the sum total of contingent concrete entities C has an external cause, that cause is necessary.
(3*) C is a contingent concrete entity.
(4*) Possibly, C has an external cause.
(5*) Therefore, possibly there is a necessary cause of C.
(6*) Therefore, there is a necessary cause of C.
What must the atheist deny? All premises seem quite strong. He must then deny (1*).
Atheist Theorem 5 (AT5): For some concrete contingent entity x it is impossible that x is caused.
Disproving AT5 is sufficient for disproving atheism.
Thus far we have Atheist Theorems 1-5:
AT1: It is not possible that a necessary concrete being exists.
AT2: Either (a) possibly nothing exists or (b) necessarily at least one contingent entity exists.
AT3: For any concrete entity x, x is contingent.
AT4: Either (a) a first cause is impossible or (b) some contingent substance is not possibly actualized by another.
AT5: For some concrete contingent entity x it is impossible that x is caused.
Disproving one of these theorems is sufficient for disproving atheism. Showing a contradiction between these beliefs and other atheist beliefs is sufficient for showing atheism as such to be incoherent. To me all of these propositions seem quite implausible in their own right.
Argument A - A Necessary Concrete Entity:
(1) Possibly a necessary concrete being exists implies a necessary concrete being exists.
(2) Possibly, a necessary concrete being exists.
(3) Therefore, a necessary concrete being exists.
Assume further that it can be shown that the necessary being is God.
What must the atheist do to deny this argument? (1) is just axiom S5. Therefore they must deny (2). This implies that (a) possibly nothing exists or (b) necessarily, there exists at least one contingent entity. This also implies that all concrete entities are contingent.
Atheist Theorem 1 (AT1): It is not possible that a necessary concrete being exists.
Atheist Theorem 2 (AT2): Either (a) possibly nothing exists or (b) necessarily there exists at least one contingent entity.
Atheist Theorem 3 (AT3): For any concrete entity x, x is contingent.
Disproving AT1, AT2 or AT3 is sufficient for refuting atheism.
Argument B - The Scotistic Cosmological Argument:
(1') Whatever is possible is contingent or necessary.
(2') A first cause is possible.
(3') Therefore, a first cause is contingent or necessary.
(4') Any contingent substance is possibly actualized by another substance.
(5') A first cause is not possibly actualized by another substance.
(6') Therefore a first cause is not contingent.
(7') Therefore, a first a cause is necessary.
What must the atheist do to deny this argument? The atheist can only really deny either (2) or (4).
Atheist Theorem 4 (AT4): Either (a) a first cause is impossible or (b) some contingent substance is not possibly actualized by another.
Hence, disproving this disjunction AT4 is sufficient for refuting atheism. Saying that (b) is false also leads to some interesting consequences about infinite regresses.
Argument C – A Modal Cosmological Argument:
(1*) Every contingent entity possibly has an external cause.
(2*) If the sum total of contingent concrete entities C has an external cause, that cause is necessary.
(3*) C is a contingent concrete entity.
(4*) Possibly, C has an external cause.
(5*) Therefore, possibly there is a necessary cause of C.
(6*) Therefore, there is a necessary cause of C.
What must the atheist deny? All premises seem quite strong. He must then deny (1*).
Atheist Theorem 5 (AT5): For some concrete contingent entity x it is impossible that x is caused.
Disproving AT5 is sufficient for disproving atheism.
Thus far we have Atheist Theorems 1-5:
AT1: It is not possible that a necessary concrete being exists.
AT2: Either (a) possibly nothing exists or (b) necessarily at least one contingent entity exists.
AT3: For any concrete entity x, x is contingent.
AT4: Either (a) a first cause is impossible or (b) some contingent substance is not possibly actualized by another.
AT5: For some concrete contingent entity x it is impossible that x is caused.
Disproving one of these theorems is sufficient for disproving atheism. Showing a contradiction between these beliefs and other atheist beliefs is sufficient for showing atheism as such to be incoherent. To me all of these propositions seem quite implausible in their own right.
Monday, March 7, 2011
Essences and Truthmakers
After reading David Oderberg's book Real Essentialism I've been concerned with getting a clear understanding of what "essences" are. Essences are not substances in themselves, over and above the entities which have them. On the other hand, they are supposed to provide explanatory power for the objects that have them, and they are supposed to have a specific sort of causal importance, in Aristotle's terms what is called "formal causation". In trying to make sense of these notions I have found truthmaking to be somewhat helpful (provided of course we have a good account of truthmaking). Here's an analysis:
Essence: For any entity X the essence of X is the truthmaker of the proposition that the real definition of X is [such and such].
To begin with, let's be clear about what exactly a truthmaker is. A truthmaker is some fact or aspect of reality in virtue of which a truthbearer, such as a proposition, statement, belief, etc., is true. How exactly is truthmaking helpful here? Well, it describes a real aspect of a thing.
Kit Fine provides a popular neo-Aristotelian definitional account of essences, saying that we can give real definitions of not only words, but entities, in order to explain what they are. These real definitions of objects are their essences. More work needs to be done on getting to the heart of what real definitions are and how we come to know them. (A possible account of what they are, which I am now somewhat doubtful of, is here.) But provided we have a clear understanding of this, Fine's account certainly seems to be on the right track, especially in the face of the failure of some modalist accounts. But according to the classical account, essences not only make things to be what they are; they provide explanations for causal powers. Definitions, which are linguistic entities, obviously do not.
As Kathrin Koslicki puts it in her paper "Essence, Necessity, and Explanation", "A definition, according to Aristotle, is a formula or statement of the essence, i.e. of what it is to be a certain kind of thing." She continues, "On Aristotle’s way of thinking, then, the explanatory power inherent in definitions, in their role as the linguistic correlates of essences, is a direct reflection of the causal power of essences." Since real definitions are the linguistic correlates of essences, truthmaking provides a way to get back to the essence itself.
Essence: For any entity X the essence of X is the truthmaker of the proposition that the real definition of X is [such and such].
To begin with, let's be clear about what exactly a truthmaker is. A truthmaker is some fact or aspect of reality in virtue of which a truthbearer, such as a proposition, statement, belief, etc., is true. How exactly is truthmaking helpful here? Well, it describes a real aspect of a thing.
Kit Fine provides a popular neo-Aristotelian definitional account of essences, saying that we can give real definitions of not only words, but entities, in order to explain what they are. These real definitions of objects are their essences. More work needs to be done on getting to the heart of what real definitions are and how we come to know them. (A possible account of what they are, which I am now somewhat doubtful of, is here.) But provided we have a clear understanding of this, Fine's account certainly seems to be on the right track, especially in the face of the failure of some modalist accounts. But according to the classical account, essences not only make things to be what they are; they provide explanations for causal powers. Definitions, which are linguistic entities, obviously do not.
As Kathrin Koslicki puts it in her paper "Essence, Necessity, and Explanation", "A definition, according to Aristotle, is a formula or statement of the essence, i.e. of what it is to be a certain kind of thing." She continues, "On Aristotle’s way of thinking, then, the explanatory power inherent in definitions, in their role as the linguistic correlates of essences, is a direct reflection of the causal power of essences." Since real definitions are the linguistic correlates of essences, truthmaking provides a way to get back to the essence itself.
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