tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.comments2023-11-26T21:30:21.796-08:00The Analytic Scholasticawatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comBlogger215125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-8788233517098439092020-09-14T16:52:00.098-07:002020-09-14T16:52:00.098-07:00I believe that when a person knowingly agrees to a...I believe that when a person knowingly agrees to a promise and knowingly never intends to keep said promise, that's the worst kind of lie there is.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-58603533932829627542020-09-05T10:16:28.644-07:002020-09-05T10:16:28.644-07:00Hi Alrfredo,
Sadly, the link to Pruss's artic...Hi Alrfredo,<br /><br />Sadly, the link to Pruss's article is no longer valid (then again, it is nearly 10 years old), so it would have been nice to have the title of his paper to look it up.<br /><br />It seems to me that this particular post is incomplete, because you don't actually identify the problems about God's nature that the Prussian Free Will Defense brings up here, much less address them; unless this is merely the introductory post in a longer critique of Pruss's argument, in which case.<br /><br />But, am I correct in concluding that NEP if true, places an obligation on God to create a world without agents of moral evil? And, that "free will" -putting aside things like Calvinist rejections of free will- would not exist in this case?Michaelhttp://thedoomedintellect.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-21332170720698011242020-08-01T01:45:35.157-07:002020-08-01T01:45:35.157-07:00This comment has been hidden from the blog.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-6987310106513116592019-08-16T00:37:54.735-07:002019-08-16T00:37:54.735-07:00Sounds like a PROMISING LIE to me !!! promising so...Sounds like a PROMISING LIE to me !!! promising something in absolution without a shadow of doubt towards the future is a lie of it self for NO Man/Woman knows what lies ahead. The promising lie is merely made to win the favor or trust of another in belief of the promise being fulfilled in later or in current time. Because of life’s uncertainty the promise from the beginning would be considered a lie, until said promise is executed in full it remains the promising lie. So Yes breaking and even making a promise is a LiE . <br />It is called the PROMISING LIE. <br />Occam’s Razor .<br />Simply Correcthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04706953923798005007noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-83815081152573991802018-07-01T11:32:45.204-07:002018-07-01T11:32:45.204-07:00When a Christian starts using complex mathematical...When a Christian starts using complex mathematical formulas and philosophical theories to defend his belief in first century corpse reanimation-transformation (aka:<br />resurrections)…I yawn.<br /><br />I yawn because it is soooo silly.<br /><br />I know for a fact that if a Muslim attempted to use these same ploys to defend the veracity of Islam’s claim that Mohammad flew to heaven on a winged horse, the very same Christians would snicker and hand-wave away these arguments without giving them a second thought, believing that these tactics are nothing more than an obvious, desperate attempt to dress up a superstition as believable reality.Garyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02519721717265344702noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-6130329966623817132017-08-05T16:24:41.915-07:002017-08-05T16:24:41.915-07:00the whole Aggregate of contingent things must be c...the whole Aggregate of contingent things must be contingent because there would have not been a set if there would not be its parts. so it needs/lacks/depends on its parts in order for it to exist. and lacking/needing/depending denotes contingency as Muslim theologians and philosophers would put it.<br /><br />i think being created not from a thing, being built out of a thing,or being born etc are ways of existence, not a property of a thing in the same sense that "red" or "small" are properties of a thing. <br /><br />so i think the analogy isn't accurate and there isn't a fallacy of composition at all as long as we're talking about the way of existence.<br /><br />in order for the objection to be valid, the counterexample must be something like this:<br />Each part of a house needs construction workers in order for it to be built, but the whole house doesn't. and that's clearly absurd.<br />If each part of a house were dependent, Then the house itself is dependent, and therefore contingent.<br /><br />i apologize if there were any mistakes since i'm not a native english speakerAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13209687584926017380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-79323098560081940812016-10-05T03:40:03.235-07:002016-10-05T03:40:03.235-07:00The problem, from the Thomist perspective, is that...The problem, from the Thomist perspective, is that you take universal to be a thing rather than a mode of a thing. For Thomas the fundamental thing at play here is not a universal, but a form that qua form is neither universal nor particular. The form is particular when composing an individual, and universal when abstracted from matter by a rational agent.<br /><br />Forms are postulated to address is the classical problem of the one and the many, not the modern question of the existence of referents in referencing sentences and propositions. The idea with the immanent forms of Aristotle (which Thomas espouses) is that two things resemble each other (exhibit unity or oneness) insofar was they are composed of matter determined in the same way, which determination is form. Considered in this way, there are two particularised forms, one in each individual. Our intellect then abstracts the matter away from each individual, resulting in a single abstract form which, at this point, is universal. This universal (abstracted form) is that by which things are referred to in our sentences and propositions: what we say applies to individuals insofar as they instantiate a form that when abstracted agrees with this universal. (This is, of course, merely a very brief summary of how the Thomist would see this working. For a detailed discussion I can recommend Lonergan's two books "Verbum" and "Insight".)<br /><br />Now, the claim that dinosaurs are big creatures is true only in virtue of the forms that characterise dinosaurs. But so long as the word "are" isn't taken in a sense committing us to the current existence of dinosaurs, the relevant forms needn't currently exist in the sense of actually characterising particular individuals. They exist only in an abstracted way in our intellect. I can refer to things that don't now exist because my intellect can arrive at abstract forms in ways other than direct abstraction from particular sensations.<br /><br />Nevertheless, the Thomist is not committed, by virtue of his theory of forms, to the metaphysically necessary existence of forms. Before there were any humans there was no individual composed with the human form.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-8795592470681341362016-08-06T18:30:19.854-07:002016-08-06T18:30:19.854-07:00Making a false promise and lying are both being de...Making a false promise and lying are both being deceitful. A promise only lives in the future and a lie is past based.<br />It is not deceitful to have a promise be unfulfilled and acknowledge that. <br />I appreciate this conversation to distinguish two distinct language phenomena.woodplayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00080293366977280918noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-5561258704647063902016-07-29T00:35:20.111-07:002016-07-29T00:35:20.111-07:00Three years later....
:)
You are assuming that t...Three years later....<br /><br />:)<br /><br />You are assuming that the whole picture had to do SOLEY with the individual. God has three options.<br /><br />1. He can save no one<br /><br />2. He can save everyone<br /><br />3. He can save someone<br /><br />In only 1 of those three options is God free to display all of His attributes and goodness. Where His mercy, kindness, justice, and power are fully on display. Thus, it is for the perfection of then universe that God chooses 3. <br /><br />What does this have to do with anticident will? God anticidently desires the salvation of all. But, after taking into account the big picture and the perfection of the universe, He decides to save only some. Those whom He loves the most. The others He allows to fail in their goodness.<br /><br />Harsh isn't it? But really no better in any system unless one embraces open theism.Kenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17822568578074296499noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-19628830037122700472016-06-15T22:30:31.577-07:002016-06-15T22:30:31.577-07:00Great post. To me, Dr. Craig's neo-theism see...Great post. To me, Dr. Craig's neo-theism seems logically inconsistent with his belief that God is the greatest conceivable being. The neo-theistic god has metaphysical parts. Anything with metaphysical parts needs a cause. So if the neo-theistic god has a cause, that cause would be greater than he, right?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14051707091618161781noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-19560901407743822742016-05-28T18:35:36.453-07:002016-05-28T18:35:36.453-07:00Thanks Charles! I think that's another excelle...Thanks Charles! I think that's another excellent example.awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-3654807477325350022016-05-09T02:10:05.491-07:002016-05-09T02:10:05.491-07:00Hallo Alfredo. Here's an example of two necess...Hallo Alfredo. Here's an example of two necessarily co-extensive properties that are not identical, hence an example of hyper-intensionality. Consider a complete Logic L. In this logic BEING A THEOREM OF L (that is being derivable by the rules from the axioms) is necessarily co-extensive with BEING L-VALID (which is given some kind of semantic interpretation). But the two properties are distinct since one has to be understood in terms of modality-plus-syntax whilst the other is a semantic property. This seems to me a better example than the ones you derive from ethics since in those cases one might argue that although the properties in question are necessarily co-extensive, the necessity there is less than logical. (It is surely conceivable that the moral properties might supervene on a different set of 'natural' properties than the properties on which they ACTUALLY supervene). [Proof: we don't have a problems understanding ethical systems with which we radically disagree. Indeed we often suspend our disbelief in, say, revenge-based ethics when enjoying s certain kinds of fiction.])<br /><br />Hope this helps. Charles Pigdenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01131765562671298571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-42514165841125439842016-02-03T18:54:58.176-08:002016-02-03T18:54:58.176-08:00If you have thoughts let me know! And I haven'...If you have thoughts let me know! And I haven't yet, though I have a draft of a post on that. (Long story short: I don't buy the arguments against trope nominalism -- I don't think there are any serious problems that can't be handled by primitive resemblance -- and I think it is simpler and does all the work an Aristotelian theory of universals would. An Aristotelian theory needs tropes anyway [unless you go the Armstrong route], and I think one can just "cut out" the universals without any harm. Obviously that's no defense but it's basically the line of thought that's persuaded me. But hopefully more on this in the future!)awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-27233112911728317682016-02-02T19:39:37.770-08:002016-02-02T19:39:37.770-08:00Cool. I just started a philosophy of mathematics c...Cool. I just started a philosophy of mathematics course, so I'll be taking you up on the first paper.<br /><br />btw, did you ever give an account anywhere on how you arrived at trope nominalism?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-81626451726363083402015-11-24T20:43:08.791-08:002015-11-24T20:43:08.791-08:00Yeah, it's a good point. I think we could say ...Yeah, it's a good point. I think we could say that. As far as incommensurability goes, the only sense in which we can't say an instance of one basic good x is better than an instance of another basic good y is in terms of x offering all the goodness of y and more. But yeah, I think we could say it would be better to do one thing over another in the sense that it would be more reasonable to do one thing over another.awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-16498735027652059302015-11-24T17:35:15.203-08:002015-11-24T17:35:15.203-08:00Hey man! 2 questions:
You say somewhere that "...Hey man! 2 questions:<br />You say somewhere that "Though even here I'm not sure; maybe there's a standard of "better than" which is not based upon having all the goodness and more of another? I don't know". Question: are the "principles of practical r'ablness" you posit later on intended to supply such a standard? Seems to me it works as a standard.<br />second question: do you see a relation b/w this discussion and the idea of "sacrifice". I am sacrificing this good for that. Why? b/c it's more r'able or whatever<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-83688572758318474752015-11-14T03:18:12.080-08:002015-11-14T03:18:12.080-08:00This comment has been hidden from the blog.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-52553857220529304892015-11-13T06:54:49.124-08:002015-11-13T06:54:49.124-08:00This comment has been hidden from the blog.awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-87518616994545955062015-11-13T06:22:53.793-08:002015-11-13T06:22:53.793-08:00This comment has been hidden from the blog.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-27299046168913661652015-11-01T16:21:28.665-08:002015-11-01T16:21:28.665-08:00You are welcome. Meta-metaphysics is fascinating a...You are welcome. Meta-metaphysics is fascinating area! My first grasp of it came from David Manley introductory essay in collection where Hofweber essay appear. I haven't idea that you listen his lectures in vivo :DMilošhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07415201615175187675noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-48038820801546160382015-11-01T07:33:33.533-08:002015-11-01T07:33:33.533-08:00Thanks Milos! I haven't read that paper in a w...Thanks Milos! I haven't read that paper in a while but I'll go through with it and see if it can help. Actually, what brought this all up is a class I'm taking with Hofweber on idealism and ineffability in metaphysics. Hofweber has his own response to this argument, but it's one I'm rather skeptical of (though, in the end, it might be right). For what it's worth, Hofweber does tend to be a less metaphysical metaphysician than others (he tends to be skeptical of a lot of metaphysical notions), and I'm worried his solution might take us in that direction. Anyway, as I think about this more I will probably post about it more!awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-84901266503407333182015-10-31T15:41:43.223-07:002015-10-31T15:41:43.223-07:00Maybe this essay can bring some light on this issu...Maybe this essay can bring some light on this issue: http://www.unc.edu/~hofweber/papers/ambitious.pdf However, I think that Hofweber metaphysics is to modest :)Milošhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07415201615175187675noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-57432115428607144202015-10-13T05:53:07.281-07:002015-10-13T05:53:07.281-07:00Thank you Milos!Thank you Milos!awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-30141398547865750042015-10-13T04:10:16.374-07:002015-10-13T04:10:16.374-07:00Actually, that's a good question Kris. My own ...Actually, that's a good question Kris. My own argument only establishes that if something is moved by something, then what moves it is non-identical to it. I take it that Aquinas's First Way has an additional premise that nothing can be moving without being moved by something (i.e. whatever is moving is moved by something), and then there is a separate clause saying that it cannot be moved by itself. Thanks for the question.awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-86860552193275895382015-10-10T12:11:02.737-07:002015-10-10T12:11:02.737-07:00You start out saying "I'm going to defend...You start out saying "I'm going to defend Aquinas's premise that whatever is moved is moved by another. Is this supposed to mean the same thing as "whatever moves is moved by another"? I don't know Aquinas too well...Kris Rhodeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02525919329465751339noreply@blogger.com