tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post2599585556643394147..comments2023-11-26T21:30:21.796-08:00Comments on The Analytic Scholastic: Thoughts on the Grounding Objection to Molinismawatkins909http://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-34132046350167883502013-09-02T00:18:14.947-07:002013-09-02T00:18:14.947-07:00Check this out, http://www.academia.edu/1021568/Pr...Check this out, http://www.academia.edu/1021568/Presentism_and_the_Grounding_of_Truth<br /><br />The grounding problem for Presentism is only a problem if one accepts truthmaking maximalism, which seems false in virtue of the negative existentials problem and necessary truths problem.<br /><br />To reformulate the problem for Presentism, one argues that the truth-supervenes-on-being thesis is true, which seems plausible. But, arguing from this thesis also fails as well as Baia demonstrates. This is because the b-theorist usually saddles the presentist with an eternalist version of the supervenience thesis. But, it seems that the Presentist only has reason to accept the presentist supervenience thesis about truth and existence. So, I don't think you can use Presentism to help out Molinism here, as WLC does. Further, it just seems like a bad practice in general to rely upon another doctrine like Presentism to support Molinism when a main objection to Presentism is the same one being launched against Molinism.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-44557616964512816192013-08-30T06:45:58.855-07:002013-08-30T06:45:58.855-07:00@awatkins69:
Thanks for the explanation; intuitiv...@awatkins69:<br /><br />Thanks for the explanation; intuitively, it looks correct. I am far from knowledgeable, but further evidence, unearthed by some casual reading, is in St. Thomas' treatment of what grounds the truth of past-tense contingent propositions in ST I.16.8.4.<br /><br />note: on rereading it, my question may have sounded like a gotcha question or that I was disputing your rejection of (A). I was just thinking out loud on how we would go about reconciling it with the fact that truth follows being.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-76456424009939142272013-08-28T17:34:05.217-07:002013-08-28T17:34:05.217-07:00I think it's also worth noting that Aquinas us...I think it's also worth noting that Aquinas uses the word 'corresponds', whereas (A) uses the word 'grounds'. Those are very different words and have importantly different meanings. Though on the face of it I think my argument could be run against even Aquinas's statement (again, if he is using being in the substantive, first sense from the De Ente quote).awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-69287262758131918502013-08-28T17:31:10.743-07:002013-08-28T17:31:10.743-07:00So, one thing is, in 'De Ente et Essentia'...So, one thing is, in 'De Ente et Essentia' Aquinas defines two senses of being. I'll just paste the quote, since I think it is perfectly clear:<br /><br />"We should notice, therefore, that the word “being,” taken without qualifiers, has two uses, as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. (1) In one way, it is used apropos of what is divided into the ten genera; (2) in another way, it is used to signify the truth of propositions. The difference between the two is that in the second way everything about which we can form an affirmative proposition can be called a being, even though it posits nothing in reality. It is in this way that privations and negations are called beings; for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that blindness is in the eye. In the first way, however, only what posits something in reality can be called a being. In the first way, therefore, blindness and the like are not beings."<br /><br />So in the second sense of being, we would call certain things 'beings' which we normally wouldn't in the full, primary sense. So, if Aquinas's De Veritate statement is using being in this second sense, then I admit it is true and don't see how it's inconsistent with what I've said (in fact, if anything, it seems to be analytically true; in this sense of 'being', being is whatever our sentence is true of, and thus there will always be a being for every true sentence).<br /><br />But if what Aquinas is saying is using the first sense of being, i.e. what falls under the ten categories, then that would seem to make him to be saying something equivalent to (A). And ultimately if Aquinas is saying something equivalent to (A) then I would reject Aquinas's statement as well for the reasons I've stated in this post.awatkins909https://www.blogger.com/profile/04272494240109130737noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5375330549366725595.post-20962319316228833392013-08-28T08:56:31.594-07:002013-08-28T08:56:31.594-07:00How would you square a rejection of (A) with the d...How would you square a rejection of (A) with the dictum that truth follows being, e.g. St. Thomas in De Veritate "To every true act of understanding there must correspond some being".grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.com